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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Volume 34 WINTER 1959 Number 2
MR. JUSTICE MINTON-HOOSIER JUSTICE ON THE
SUPREME COURTt
HARRY L. WALLACEt
By virtue of the "special trust and confidence' placed in him by
President Truman, Sherman Minton ascended to the bench of the Su-
preme Court of the United States on October 12, 1949. Seven years
later he retired in ill health, voluntarily but reluctantly ending a career
of a quarter-century of public service, the broad scope of which, coupled
with his experience in private practice, had appeared to justify President
Truman's trust. The decisions of the Court during this period reflect
many important fragments of world history in the decade immediately
following World War II. No one now knows for certain whether the
events of this decade represented only an inconclusive continuation of an
apparently unceasing international struggle for power, or whether they
marked a decisive shift in direction-and if the latter, whether that shift
was toward the beginnings of a better world of peace on earth or toward
the end of a world well worth preserving despite its faults. Whatever
the ultimate outcome, to many Americans the events of this decade ap-
peared to create problems of almost unprecedented significance, calling
for correspondingly unique solutions, the validity and scope of which
reached the Court for consideration and resolution.
The mood during this period reflected the frustration of a nation,
anxious to turn from total war to enjoy theretofore unknown prosperity,
but forced to continue to wage a war which, whether hot or cold, inter-
mittently carried it to the "brink" of world devastation. American
soldiers were stationed all over the world, and on the whole behaved much
as they had at home. Some got in one familiar kind of trouble with
girls,' while others, perhaps undertaking more permanent trouble, mar-
t This article appears in two parts. The second part will appear in the Spring issue.
f Associate in the firm of Fairchild, Foley & Sammond, Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
formerly law clerk to Justice Minton.
1. 338 U.S. xi (1949).
2. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 844 (1953).
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ried them and sought to bring them home.' A few of the thousands of
others who avoided these difficulties by taking their wives overseas with
them were thereby brought to the end of all their earthly troubles.4 At
home some men refused to fight at all,5 while other long-time residents
were banished to foreign shores forever.6 As a result of televised crime
hearings, the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination' be-
came a household phrase and in subsequent investigations of Communist
activities was almost converted to an epithet by the late junior Senator
from Wisconsin. While the federal government grappled with the com-
plicated problems created by these events, the states too attempted to deal
with threats to their institutions and to the safety and welfare of their citi-
zens, sometimes seeing their efforts thwarted by the "supreme law of the
land,"8 particularly when those efforts were directed against Negroes
who sought to obtain the equality before the law for which another war
had been fought many years before.5 Business at home continued much
as usual, and criminal business was no exception. The police combatted
it with most of their old methods and some new ones." The events of
the period pitted one asserted absolute against another, and required the
Court to weigh and choose between them. The purpose of this article
is to examine Justice Minton's role with respect to problems such as
these, as well as some more prosaic, and to attempt to draw some conclu-
sions with respect to his views of the functions of the Court and to the
manner in which he executed them.
3. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
4. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), 351 U.S. 487 (1956) ; Kinsella v. Krueger,
351 U.S. 470 (1956) ; Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
5. See, e.g., Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955); Simmons v. United
States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955) ; Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955) ; Witmer v.
United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955) ; Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953)
United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953).
6. See, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955) ; Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) ; Harisiades
v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 521 (1950).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V; cf. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S.
551 (1956) ; Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) ; Blau v. United States, 340
U.S. 159 (1950).
8. U.S. CONST. art. VI; see, e.g., Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., supra
note 7; Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183 (1952).
9. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249 (1953) ; Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) ; Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949).
10. Compare United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), with On Lee v.
United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). Compare Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953),
zwith Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954),
and Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
MINTON, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
I. GOVERNMENTAL POWER TO RESTRICT INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
While the Court is the final arbiter of a wide variety of problems of
federal statutory interpretation which frequently have an important im-
pact on the nation and its people, of more permanent significance are its
constitutional decisions which remain the law of the land indefinitely in
the absence of either constitutional amendment or a change of heart by
the Court. The two most important and recurrent types of questions of
constitutional power are those which involve restrictions on the power
of the states to act under our federal system, and those which involve the
power of government, state or federal, to restrict individual freedom. Of
the latter some involve substantive restrictions while others relate to the
procedures which may be employed in implementing such restrictions.
The curious combination of courage and fear born of involvement
in war inevitably brings forth a wide variety of stringent measures by
those directly responsible for the formulation and administration of
government. Even, or perhaps especially, in a democracy there must be
some restraints on the tyranny of the majority, for at least in the heat
of the moment, majority action may be not only unwise but fundamen-
tally unfair. The provisions of the Bill of Rights and the restrictions on
state action achieved only after an agonizing Civil War would be empty
indeed if Congress and the state legislatures were the sole arbiters of the
validity of legislative restraints on individual freedom.1 On the other
hand excessive protection of individual liberty would in the end ill serve
the cause of freedom, for without some such restraints there is neither
law nor liberty. 2 As society becomes increasingly industrialized and
complex, and as men's capacity for destroying each other reaches ever
more awesome proportions, reconciliation of one man's freedom to act
with another's freedom to be let alone becomes increasingly difficult.
Collisions between the two presented the Court with some of its most
difficult and controversial problems during Justice Minton's tenure on
the Court.
A. REGULATION OF "SUBvERsIvEs" DURING TEE COLD WAR
1. Power to Outlaw Speech and Beliefs. In the eyes of some, the
people and their Government were on trial with the "first string" of the
American Communist Party in Dennis v. United States."3  Despite the
11. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REV. 193
(1952); Braden, Mr. Justice Minton and the Truman Bloc, 26 IND. L.J. 153 (1951).
12. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
13. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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first amendment's admonition that "Congress shall make no law . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . .,""4 differences of
opinion among members of the Court have turned primarily on when,
rather than whether, speech may be restrained. Legislation aimed at in-
ternal subversion was not invented during the cold war, nor for that
matter was it original when Justice Holmes formulated the "clear and
present danger" test to sustain a conviction for conspiring to impede the
draft laws by urging disobedience to them.15 Relying in large part on
the presumption of constitutionality of all legislation, a majority of the
Court subsequently rejected the applicability of this test to convictions
under statutes expressly outlawing "advocacy" of governmental over-
throw-speech itself-limiting the test to cases in which speech had con-
stituted the violation of some particular type of proscribed conduct."
But Justice Brandeis joined Justice Holmes in urging its applicability to
statutes expressly prohibiting speech itself and sought to give some direc-
tion to the content of the formula embodied in this oversimplified label.
Concurring in Whitney v. California, 7 he urged that while fundamental
rights such as speech are not absolute, interference with them is consti-
tutional only when there is reasonable ground to fear that imminent
danger of serious evil exists. Subsequent decisions indicated a shift to-
ward the Holmes-Brandeis view and went on to question how much re-
liance should be placed on the legislative determination prohibiting par-
ticular types of speech which, along with certain other fundamental
rights, was sometimes said to occupy a "preferred position."
'1
In the Dennis case the evidence supported the conclusion that the
defendants were engaged in a highly organized conspiracy to overthrow
the Government by force whenever there appeared to be a reasonable
chance of success. Chief Justice Vinson's plurality opinion sustaining the
convictions, which Justice Minton joined, purported to adopt the
Brandeis-Holmes formulation, avoiding any reference to the presump-
tion of constitutionality, but holding that where the threatened evil is so
serious, its success need not be imminent. Justice Frankfurter, con-
curring separately, placed greater reliance on the legislative judgment,
14. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
15. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ; see also Pierce v. United States,
252 U.S. 239 (1920) ; Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920) ; Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) ; Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) ; Frohwerk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
16. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) ; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925).
17. 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (concurring opinion).
18. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949) ; cf. id. at 90-97 (concurring
opinion).
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while Justice Jackson urged that the clear and present danger formula
should be applied only to isolated advocacy and not to an organized, con-
tinuing conspiracy. Justices Black and Douglas dissented, the former
urging that the first amendment precludes any restraint on speech, and
the latter on the ground that the defendants did no more than engage in
a classroom exercise. On the surface there is considerable justification
for the view that the Chief Justice's opinion waters down the require-
ment of imminency set forth by Justice Brandeis, thereby failing to ob-
serve the "preferred position" of free speech and ignoring Brandeis'
admonition that "if there be time to expose through discussion the false-
hood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."'" But facts,
not slogans, decide lawsuits, and even a preferred position is not an im-
pregnable one. Justice Brandeis' opinion in the Whitney case required
that the Court itself consider the applicability of the clear and present
danger test to the particular defendants before it, rather than relying
solely on the legislative determination that all speech of a particular type
should be punished. In the context of the cases in which Holmes and
Brandeis dissented, they could quite reasonably protest against punish-
ment of the defendants' "puny anonymities"2' without necessarily acqui-
escing in the organized conspiracy found by the majority in Dennis.
While Deimis represented an import.ant milestone in the relationship
between Americans and their Government, it did not, as some may have
hoped and others feared, settle all similar problems for all time. Condi-
tions constantly change, not only raising new problems, but also casting
old ones in a new light. Moreover, the Court must necessarily stick to
the case before it, leaving other factual situations for later determination
when they arise. For example, the Party's "second string" recently
fared far better than their superiors, although on narrow grounds relat-
ing to the construction of the statute and the instructions of the trial
court.2
A more striking contrast to the Dennis decision is embodied in Penn-
sylvania v. Nelson,22 holding unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute
punishing attempts to overthrow the state or federal government as ap-
plied to conduct aimed solely at the overthrow of the federal government.
19. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (concurring opinion).
20. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) ; see Richardson, Freedom
of Exprcssion and the Function of the Courts, 65 HARv. L. Rxv. 1 (1951) ; Nathanson,
The Communist Trial and the Clear-and-Present Danger Test, 63 HARv. L. Rav. 1167
(1950).
21. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
22. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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The Court reasoned that by enactment of the Smith Act2 the federal
government had occupied the field in this area and thereby precluded state
legislation prohibiting the same conduct. Admitting that this state statute
overlapped a federal act regulating the same conduct, this result was by
no means clear, since there was neither any conflict between the state
and federal legislation nor any express indication in the federal act that
it was intended to be exclusive. In fact, a contrary expression appears
in the criminal code, of which the Smith Act is a part, which provides in
pertinent part that "nothing in this title shall be held to take away or
impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the
laws thereof."2 4 This problem of overlapping state and federal regula-
tion of the same subject recurs more frequently in connection with gov-
ernmental regulation of economic affairs. By joining the dissenters in
the Nelson case, Justice Minton demonstrated his reluctance to upset such
state legislation in the absence of a clear conflict with comparable federal
enactments, a reluctance which reappears in his approach to state at-
tempts to regulate local aspects of business also subject to federal control.
These two cases, then, illustrate in an explosive context the two re-
curring constitutional problems-the power of government to restrict in-
dividual freedom and the power of the states to act in areas of possible
interest on both a local and national level. In the former, by joining
Chief Justice Vinson's plurality opinion, Justice Minton clearly placed
himself in support of the power of government to impose restrictions on
the absolute freedom of individuals. In the latter, by joining Justice
Reed's dissent, he revealed his preference for recognition of state power
in the absence of its clear displacement by federal action. His votes in
these two cases accurately reflect his position in a number of other cases,
including several in which he himself wrote the Court's opinion.
2. Power to Deny "Privileges" to "Subversives." In addition to
criminal punishment, another weapon in the governmental arsenal to
combat the effectiveness of those who favor the violent overthrow of
government lies in excluding such persons from positions of influence
and importance. Frequently, this was sought to be accomplished through
imposition of so-called "loyalty oaths" as a condition of obtaining govern-
ment employment or other government-conferred positions. Although
the power of the states to impose criminal punishment on supposed sub-
versives was severely limited by the Nelson decision, their efforts to ex-
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1952); cf. Note, State Control of Subversion: A Problem
in Federalism, 66 HARv. L. REv. 327 (1952).
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elude such persons from state employment were considerably more
successful.
In American Communications Ass'n v. Douds" the Court sustained
the "non-Communist oath" provision of the Taft-Hartley Act26 which
withdrew the benefits of the Act from unions whose officers had failed
to file an oath that they did not then believe in the violent overthrow of
the Government and did not then belong to the Communist Party or any
organization that so believed. In Garner v. Board of Pub. Works" it
sustained the Los Angeles loyalty oath which required each employee to
file an affidavit with respect to his Communist Party membership and
to swear that he did not now advocate, and had not within five years
from enactment of the ordinance advocated, violent overthrow of the
Government, and did not and had not within such period belonged to an
organization which so advocated. Thus, this oath went farther than the
Taft-Hartley oath in that it applied to past advocacy and membership,
although the Court assumed it applied only to membership with knowl-
edge of the organization's offending purposes. Similarly, in Adler v.
Board of Educ.2" the Court sustained New York's Feinberg Law29 which
prohibits employment of teachers who now advocate the violent over-
throw of the Government or who are now members of organizations
which they know so advocate, treating such membership as prima facie
evidence of disqualification.
But subsequent decisions marked out limitations on the power of
states to provide qualifications for state employment and other state-
conferred privileges. Thus, in Wieman. v. Updegraff2 ° it unanimously
struck down the Oklahoma loyalty oath which the Oklahoma court had
appeared to interpret as requiring automatic disqualification from public
employment for even innocent membership in a proscribed organization.
On somewhat the same reasoning the Court held in Slochower v. Board
of Higher Educ.2 ' that a state may not constitutionally automatically dis-
charge a teacher who had claimed the privilege against self-incrimination
in a federal investigation since this amounted to a conclusive and arbi-
trary presumption of guilt from the claim of the privilege. However,
the Court recently upheld such a discharge where the state treated the
claim as a failure to cooperate in a reasonable inquiry into the employee's
25. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
26. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (h) (1952).
27. 341 U.S. 716 (1951); cf. Parker v. County of Los Angeles, 338 U.S. 327
(1949).
28. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
29. N.Y. Enuc. LAW §§ 3021-22.
30. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
31. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
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qualifications.3 2 In this case the employee had clearly been warned that
failure to answer might result in his discharge which enabled the Court
to distinguish it from Konigsberg v. State Bar"3 in which the Court held
that California could not refuse an applicant admission to the bar al-
though the applicant, after stating that he did not believe in the violent
overthrow of government, adamantly refused to answer questions con-
cerning his alleged membership in the Communist Party.
The attacks on governmental action of this nature were placed on
several grounds, many of which were raised in the Adler case in which
Justice Minton wrote the Court's opinion sustaining New York's Fein-
berg Law. In both Adler and Douds, a principal contention was that the
legislation violated the first amendment rights of those affected. Justice
Minton brushed this contention aside, saying: "If they do not choose to
work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and as-
sociations and go elsewhere. . . . His' freedom of choice between mem-
bership in the organization and employment in the school system might
be limited, but not his freedom of speech or assembly, except in the re-
mote sense that limitation is inherent in every choice."34  As a practical
matter, it seems doubtful that the choice is really quite as free as Justice
Minton's reasoning would indicate. To one who has devoted his adult
life to service in the public schools, the threat of discharge may often be
as great a sanction as a criminal conviction, depending somewhat, of
course, on the nature and extent of the criminal punishment. Chief Jus-
tice Vinson was more candid in the Douds case when he conceded that in
enacting the non-Communist oath provision of the Taft-Hartley Act,
"Congress has undeniably discouraged the lawful exercise of political
freedoms as well. . . . Men who hold union offices often have little
choice but to renounce Communism or give up their offices.""3
At least for Justice Black this concession, that such enactments to
some extent do inhibit the exercise of rights of free speech and beliefs, is
sufficient to render them unconstitutional. But for the majority of the
Court, this was merely the statement of the problem and not of its solu-
tion. In Justice Minton's words, while "it is clear that such persons have
the right under our law to assemble, speak, think and believe as they will
. . . it is equally clear that they have no right to work for the State in
32. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
33. 353 U.S. 252 (1957); cf. First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles,
357 U.S. 545 (1958) ; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Dayton v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 144 (1958) ; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) ; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234 (1957).
34. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952).
35. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393 (1950).
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the school system on their own terms." Of course, this does not mean
that the privilege of government employment may be denied on an arbi-
trary basis, but rather that government, like any other employer, may
prescribe reasonable qualifications for employment so that teachers may
only "work for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid down
by the proper authorities of New York." 7  Moreover, as Chief Justice
Vinson pointed out in the Douds case, the federal government has con-
ferred considerable power on union officers (as do the states on lawyers,
for example), and such power entails corresponding obligations and re-
sponsibility."
The decisive inquiry then is whether or not loyalty to the Govern-
ment is a reasonable standard for government employment. Perhaps the
answer depends in part on the nature of the employment. A subway
conductor or a janitor in the Post Office may stand on a different foot-
ing from the Secretary of Defense, or for that matter, from a janitor in
the latter's office."3 In any event, with respect to teachers, Justice Min-
ton delivered a ringing affirmative answer to which a majority of the
present Court has since adhered :40
A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There
he shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in
which they live. In this, the state has a vital concern. It must
preserve the integrity of the schools. That the school authori-
ties have the right and the duty to screen the officials, teachers,
and employees as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of
the schools as a part of ordered society, cannot be doubted."
Even Justice Douglas, dissenting in the Adler case, conceded that
"the school systems of the country need not become cells for Communist
activities; and the classrooms need not become forums for propagandiz-
ing the Marxist creed. '4 2  But, he argued, "the guilt of the teacher
should turn on overt acts. So long as she is a law-abiding citizen, so
long as her performance within the public school system meets profes-
sional standards, her private life, her political philosophy, her social creed
should not be the cause of reprisals against her.""3 Obviously, Justice
36. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
37. Ibid.
38. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401-04 (1950).
39. Compare Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958), with Cole v. Young, 351 U.S.
536 (1956).
40. See Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
41. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952).
42. Id. at 511 (dissenting opinion).
43. Ibid.
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Douglas does not mean that everyone who stays out of jail is entitled to
teach in the schools, for he does refer to "professional standards" which
he apparently assumes do not include loyalty to the Government. But if
the state can prevent its classrooms from becoming Communist propa-
ganda platforms, it is hard to see why the state must wait for some overt
act of disloyalty. The problem here is not to determine the teacher's
guilt but to protect the schools and the pupils in them. The danger is
not that some New York schoolmarm is going to lead a band of fourth-
grade rebels in an attack on Washington, but rather that a person who
advocates disloyalty, publicly or privately, may subtly poison the minds
of impressionable youngsters. As Chief Justice Vinson pointed out in
the Douds case, legislation such as this is not designed to prevent incite-
ments to revolution but rather to forestall the havoc which persons who
advocate disloyalty may cause if placed in positions of authority and
responsibility." Because the government may not lock up an advocate of
disloyalty if there is time to expose the fallacy of his ideas in the market
place, it does not follow that it must necessarily employ him in the schools
to expound those fallacious ideas to the children with whose care he
would be entrusted.
Assuming that loyalty may be made a standard of government em-
ployment, the next question, and the principal one considered in the Adler
case, is whether or not membership in a subversive organization may be
treated as evidence of disloyalty. Again, Justice Minton answered with
a loud and clear affirmative:
One's associates, past and present, as well as one's conduct,
may properly be considered in determining fitness and loyalty.
From time immemorial, one's reputation has been determined
in part by the company he keeps. In the employment of of fi-
cials and teachers of the school system, the state may very
properly inquire into the company they keep, and we know of
no rule, constitutional or otherwise, that prevents the state,
when determining the fitness and loyalty of such persons, from
considering the organizations and persons with whom they
associate.45
This conclusion has been vigorously attacked as determining "guilt by
association."46  To me this is another slogan with an appealing ring
which does not stand up under scrutiny. Certainly, people may join
44. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 396 (1950).
45. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952).
46. Id. at 508 (dissenting opinion); see O'Brian, New Encroachments on htdizvdual
Freedom, 66 HAav. L. REv. 1, 24 (1954).
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organizations unaware of their purposes or perhaps even in hopes of
changing them, or the purposes may change, so that automatic disqualifi-
cation for any such membership, innocent or not, is fundamentally un-
fair, as Justice Minton recognized in joining the Court's unanimous de-
cision in the Wieman case. But membership in a subversive organization
with knowledge of its proscribed purposes is certainly some indication,
although not conclusive, of sympathy with and adherence to such pur-
poses. Not only was the Feinberg Law so limited, but in addition the
employee was given a hearing at which the presumption of disqualifica-
tion arising from such membership disappeared when met with substan-
tial contrary evidence offered by the employee.4 In the context of the
Adler case, it seems unfair to characterize the decision as approving "guilt
by association."
Still a third attack leveled against such legislation when applied to
past membership was that it constituted a bill of attainder. While this
issue was not present in the Adler case, it was earlier rejected in the
Garner decision in which Justice Minton joined, sustaining the Los
Angeles oath and affidavit requirements.48 The Court concluded that
the state may prescribe reasonable standards of employment and that
"past conduct may well relate to present fitness; past loyalty may well
have a reasonable relationship to present and future trust."49  Actually,
this problem goes back to the question whether or not loyalty is a proper
qualification for government employment. If so, it is likewise reason-
able to exclude someone who has advocated disloyalty in the recent past.
If not, then it is logical to assume that the legislation represents punish-
ment for past acts. Again, this is a question of degree. As Justice Bur-
ton pointed out, the Los Angeles statute which applied to advocacy or
membership within five years from enactment of the ordinance would
eventually apply to anyone who had ever so advocated or belonged, how-
ever long and convincingly he might have since reformed."0 Perhaps this
issue was not pertinent in that case because it did not appear that any
party was so situated, but it arose again in Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners" in which the Court unanimously struck down New Mexico's
denial of admission of a bar applicant who admitted earlier Communist
Party membership but persuasively demonstrated, not only that such
membership was largely innocent of any evil purpose, but also that it had
47. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 495-96 (1952).
48. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
49. Id. at 720.
50. Id. at 729 (dissenting opinion).
51. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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terminated 15 years earlier following which his conduct had been ex-
emplary.
A somewhat different problem was presented in the Konigsberg case
in which a California bar applicant presented considerable evidence of his
good character, swore he did not believe in the violent overthrow of
government, but although not relying on the privilege against self-
incrimination, simply refused to answer questions concerning his alleged
Communist Party membership. Despite this refusal to answer questions
relevant to the inquiry, in sharp contrast to Schware's candid admissions,
the Court held that it was a denial of due process for California to deny
him admission to the bar. It is hard to understand why such an appli-
cant, or any litigant for that matter, should be permitted to put in only
his side of the case and refuse to discuss anything else which may be
unfavorable to him.
5 2
For the most part the Court was sharply divided in these cases. Of
those cases in which Justice Minton participated, he voted with the ma-
jority in every case except Slowchower (denying state power to discharge
a teacher who claimed the Fifth Amendment), and he voted to sustain
the legislation challenged in each instance except in the Wieman case (de-
nying state power to provide automatic disqualification for innocent
membership in a subversive organization). While he did not participate
in the Douds decision, he indicated his adherence to its upholding of the
Taft-Hartley non-Communist oath in a subsequent case decided per
curiam.53
Thus, with the single exception of the Wieman case in which the
Court was unanimous in striking down "an assertion of arbitrary
power," 4 in all of the cases of this nature in which he participated, Jus-
tice Minton consistently voted to sustain the power asserted by govern-
ments to deny government employment and other privileges to supposed
subversives. Although this unquestionably had the effect of limiting the
complete freedom of speech and beliefs of persons desiring to qualify for
such positions, Justice Minton obviously believed that the interests of the
public sought to be protected were sufficient to sustain the existence of
governmental power to impose these limited and indirect restraints,
whether or not the exercise of that power was wise or effective.
Fundamentally, the objections to the various types of regulation of
Communists and so-called subversives revolved around the belief that
advocacy of violent overthrow of the Government could not be outlawed
52. Cf. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
53. Osman v. Douds, 339 U.S. 846 (1950).
54. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
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or discouraged by the majority any more than the activity of any un-
popular political minority, a belief which was supplemented by the fear
that innocent persons might be swept into the net supposedly reserved for-
true subversives since "when the witch hunt is on'' 55 guilt by association
runs riot. While it is undoubtedly true that in recent years, and prob-
ably throughout history, many people have attributed any form of un-
orthodoxy to subversive tendencies, the power to enact laws should not
be judged by the views of their most exereme adherents. It would be
no more foolish to ban Robin Hood as Communistic than to burn Huckle-
berry Finn as racially offensive.
B. REGULATION RELATING TO RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES
Although the states encountered relatively few setbacks in their at-
tempts to regulate subversives, they were far less successful in their at-
tempts to regulate and discriminate against racial and religious minorities.
In part at least this difference was attributable to differences in the na-
ture of the public interests asserted in justification of the restrictions
sought to be imposed. Regulation of so-called political minorities which
urged the violent overthrow of government sometimes brought into play
important considerations of security and ultimately of survival. Dis-
criminatory denial of permission to hold a peaceful religious meeting
obviously could not be justified by any such significant public interest.
But descriminations based on race or religion fared little better even
when asserted to be necessary to preserve peace and order and, ulti-
matly, a way of life claimed to be preferred by the vast majority of all
concerned. Such legislation generally ran afoul not of the due process
clause, with its requirement of reasonableness, but of the more specific
prohibition of denial of equal protection of the laws. But the problems
relating to minorities did not end with attempts by the states to discrimi-
nate against them. Even more difficult were cases involving, at least
primarily, discrimination by individuals, which raised questions of the
circumstances under which a state may or must eliminate private dis-
crimination.
In two cases Justice Minton joined unanimous decisions striking
down convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses for giving religious speeches
in public parks which were permitted by the respective states to members
of more orthodox religious sects."6 These state convictions were vulner-
able in two respects. First, they interfered with the defendants' re-
55. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 509 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
56. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) ; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268 (1951).
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ligious freedom. This interference might well have been justified by
the public interest in the parks, however, had it been evenly applied to all
religious groups.0 But arbitrary discrimination against an unpopular
religious group was sufficient to render the states' action unconstitu-
tional as a denial of equal protection of the laws." That this is true is
indicated by the Court's unanimous decisions striking down discrimina-
tory treatment of Negroes in cases in which no first amendment rights
were involved. Thus, Justice Minton joined in decisions based upon
equal protection grounds striking down Texas' refusal to admit a Negro
to its white law school," and Oklahoma's requirement that a Negro
graduate student sit at a separate desk and cafeteria table,6" discrimina-
tory treatment which in each instance the Court found resulted in un-
equal educational opportunity for the Negro.
More difficult, of course, was the problem presented in the Segrega-
tion Cases1 in which Justice Minton joined the Court's unanimous deci-
sion holding segregation in primary and secondary schools unconstitu-
tional although there was no inequality in terms of physical facilities, in-
struction and all the other more obvious ingredients of such an educa-
tion. No other issue during this period has stirred such widespread pub-
lic controversy, and many have pointed to the Court's decision as the ulti-
mate example of its interference in matters of strictly local concern. But
this case really had little or nothing to do with "states' rights," the tenth
amendment or federal control of primary education. The fourteenth
amendment expressly forbids the states to "deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."62  In the absence of this
provision it might be arguable that the Southern states could justify
segregated schools as necessary to preserve peace and order and a "way
of life." But at best it is wishful thinking to talk about these cases in
terms of states' rights as if the Civil War had never been fought and the
fourteenth amendment never adopted. Conceding that the literal lan-
guage of the equal protection clause does not provide a ready answer to
the question presented in these cases, it is at least clear that this is the
kind of problem at which the amendment was aimed.6" Moreover, the
57. Cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (sustaining "released time" re-
ligious program during school hours).
58. See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) (concurring opinion).
59. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
60. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
61. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
62. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
63. See Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1955) ; see also Leflar & Wylie, Segregation in the Public Schools-
1953, 67 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1954).
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decisions of the Court in the past twenty-five years interpreting this pro-
vision step by step led to its conclusion that a state may not constitu-
tionally differentiate between persons on the basis of race,6" at least in
the absence of very extraordinary circumstances not demonstrated in
these cases."
A different set of problems are presented, however, when one mi-
nority turns on another. For example, in Kunz v. New York,66 Justice
Minton joined the Court in reversing the conviction of a rabble-rouser
for speaking in a public park without a required license which had been
denied because several years earlier, when he had a license, he had de-
livered violent diatribes against Catholics and Jews. In Beauharnais v.
Illinois,67 on the other hand, he joined in sustaining the defendant's con-
viction under Illinois' "group libel" statute for distribution of an anti-
Negro pamphlet. The two decisions are not inconsistent, however. Kunz
was convicted not for what he was saying at the time of his arrest, but
for speaking at all, and the privilege of speaking was denied him under
a broad statute conferring absolute and arbitrary powers on an adminis-
trative official. Beauharnais, on the other hand, was convicted because
the content of his pamphlet violated a more narrowly drawn statute
aimed at a serious and specific social problem. The Beauharnais case is
interesting, and in some respects disturbing, however, for a number of
reasons. Justice Frankfurter's opinion assumed that Beauharnais' de-
rogatory remarks about Negroes as a group "are no essential part of an
exposition of ideas, and are of . . slight social value as a step to
truth."6  He concluded, therefore, that the statute should be sustained
if there was a reasonable basis for it, the same reasoning, it seems to me,
which had earlier led temporarily to sustaining state legislation requir-
ing Jehovah's Witnesses to salute the flag contrary to their religious con-
victions.69 However, as Justice Black, dissenting, pointed out, and as
anyone who reads today's newspapers knows, charges such as Beauhar-
nais' are matters of extensive public discussion and disagreement. La-
64. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) ; Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249 (1953) ; Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) ; Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953) ; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) ; Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). "The basis of selection [of a grand jury] cannot con-
sciously take color into account." Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 295 (1950) (con-
curring opinion). "[D]iscriminations based on race alone are obviously irrelevant and
invidious." Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944).
65. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
66. 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
67. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), sustaining convictions under ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 471 (1957).
68. Id. at 257.
69. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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beling such speech as "libel" does not automatically remove it from the
area of public debate. Justice Frankfurter's appraisal of the value of
this speech presupposes "truths" with which a sizeable minority, how-
ever erroneously, vehemently disagree. Thus, Justice Jackson urged that
if Beauharnais is wrong, his false conclusions can be exposed by counter
arguments, so that to the extent the first amendment applies equally to
the states, Beauharnais should be permitted to speak unless there is a
clear and present danger that his scurrilous charges will cause a breach
of the peace or an injury to reputation-which the majority opinion
points out "may depend as much on the reputation of the racial and re-
ligious group to which he willy-nilly belongs, as on his own merits."7 On
the facts in this case, Beauharnais' conviction might well still stand on
the ground that his pamphlet did create an imminent danger of serious
breaches of the peace or wrongful injury to reputation, but certainly the
standard would be different from that applied in the majority opinion.
Also of interest was Justice Jackson's conclusion that greater freedom
in restraining speech is accorded the states under the fourteenth amend-
ment than to Congress under the first amendment.7 1 This argument
stems from the Court's decisions holding that the fourteenth amendment
does not make applicable to the states all of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights, but only those fundamental rights "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."72  Although freedom of speech is such a fundamental
"liberty" protected against state action, it is arguable as an original mat-
ter that the scope of that protection is not co-extensive with the first
amendment's protection against Congressional action.73 Thus, the real
importance of the case lies not so much in the result as in the variety of
routes suggested in the various opinions.
In Feiner v. New York,"4 Justice Minton joined in dissenting from
the Court's decision sustaining the defendant's conviction for a breach
of the peace for continuing his sidewalk speech after the police had di-
rected him to stop. His speech was not, like those of Kunz and Beau-
harnais, an exaggerated attack on some racial or religious group but
rather an appeal to Negroes to assert their rights, and unlike Beauharnais
70. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1952); cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249 (1953).
71. See id. at 288-95 (dissenting opinion).
72. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
73. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (dissenting opinion)
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288-95 (1950) (dissenting opinion) ; Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 500-06 (1957) (dissenting opinion) ; Note, Limiting State
Action by the Fowrteenth Amendment: Consequences of Abandoning the Theory of
First Amendment Incorporation, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1016 (1954).
74. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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he was not punished under a specific statute proscribing the type of
speech involved. No personal insults were directed at his audience, and
while he did refer to both the mayor of Syracuse and President Truman
as "bums," the latter at least, whether or not with justification, has prob-
ably been called worse by far more people than our jails have room for,
and is capable of replying in kind. Moreover, as Justice Frankfurter
pointed out in Beauharnais, "public men, are, as it were, public prop-
erty." 5  Nor is the fact that he apparently urged the Negroes in his
audience, a mixture of white and colored people, to "rise up in arms '"76
persuasive since there was clearly no imminent danger of armed revolt,
nor was he arrested to prevent such an attempt. The real basis for his
arrest lay not in what he said nor where he said it, but in the threat of
violence from those white people in the audience who disagreed with
what he said. Thus, the Court concluded that Feiner was "neither ar-
rested nor convicted for the making or the content of his speech. Rather,
it was the reaction which it actually engendered."77  As Justice Frank-
furter put it, concurring: "It is not a constitutional principle that, in
acting to preserve order, the police must proceed against the crowd, what-
ever its size and temper, and not against the speaker.""8 If the content
of Feiner's speech did not justify his arrest, then apart from the crowd's
reaction, it was constitutionally protected, just as, for example, under
the Segregation Cases a Negro's right to attend state supported schools
is constitutionally protected against denial solely on the basis of race.
Justification of Feiner's conviction on the basis of the crowd's reaction
lends support to the exclusion of Negroes from Little Rock's Central
High in order to preserve law and order. But not even Governor Faubus
appears to have been surprised by the Court's unanimous decision direct-
ing implementation of the school board's plan for integration of the
school. 9 It is difficult to believe that constitutional rights should be lost
by the law's own default in restraining unlawful mob action.
Still another variation arose in the Jaybird case"° in which Justice
Minton was the lone dissenter from the Court's decision that the Jay-
bird Party's pre-primary private elections from which Negroes were ex-
cluded violated the fifteenth amendment's command that "No state shall
deny any person the right to vote on the basis of race, color or previous
75. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1950).
76. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 317 (1951).
77. Id. at 319-20.
78. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 289 (1951) (concurring opinion).
79. Aaron v. Cooper, 78 Sup. Ct. 1399 (1958).
80. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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condition of servitude."'" It was long ago decided that private discrim-
ination, however unworthy, is not forbidden by the fourteenth and fif-
teenth amendments which by their terms apply only to "state" action.8"
While there is no question but that the Jaybird Party deprived Negroes
of an effective voice in the selection of elective officials, it is extremely
difficult to trace this result to any action by the state. For Justice Min-
ton, the issue in the case was not the social desirability of the result but
one of power. In one of his best opinions, he carefully analyzed all three
opinions of the majority, distinguished the principal decisions relied up-
on by them, all in light of the facts in the record, and concluded that
the activities of the Jaybird Party did not bring state action into play.
In his words:
I am not concerned in the least as to what happens to the
Jaybirds or their unworthy scheme. I am concerned about
what this Court says is state action within the meaning of the
Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution. For, after all, this
Court has power to redress a wrong under that Amendment
only if the wrong is done by the State.
What the Jaybird Association did here was to conduct as
individuals, separate and apart from the Democratic Party or
the State, a straw vote as to who should receive the Associa-
tion's endorsement for county and precinct offices. It has
been successful in seeing that those who receive its endorsement
are nominated and elected. That is true of concerted action by
any group. In numbers there is strength. In organization
there is effectiveness..
I do not understand that concerted action of individuals
which is successful somehow becomes state action ...
The propriety of these practices is something the
courts sensibly have left to the good or bad judgment of the
electorate. It must be recognized that elections and other pub-
lic business are influenced by all sorts of pressures from care-
fully organized groups. We have pressure from labor unions,
from the National Association of Manufacturers, from the Sil-
ver Shirts, from the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People, from the Ku Klux Klan and others. Far
from the activities of these groups being properly labeled as
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
82. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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state action, under either the Fourteenth or the Fifteenth
Amendment, they are to be considered as attempts to influence
or obtain state action.
The courts do not normally pass upon these pressure
groups, whether their causes are good or bad, highly successful
or only so-so. It is difficult for me to see how this Jaybird
Association is anything but such a pressure group.
In this case the majority have found that this pressure
group's work does constitute state action. The basis of this
conclusion is rather difficult to ascertain. Apparently it derives
mainly from a dislike of the goals of the Jaybird Association.
I share that dislike. I fail to see how it makes state action. I
would affirm."
Justice Minton had taken a somewhat similar position the year be-
fore in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard,4 dissenting from
a decision sustaining an injunction against a railway labor contract ob-
tained by a white brakemen's union which discriminated against Negro
train porters who performed largely brakemen's duties but who had a
separate bargaining representative because they were denied membership
in the white union. It had been held earlier that a white union which was
the collective bargaining representative for Negroes as well as its own
members, vested by federal statute with great power, could not use that
power to discriminate against Negroes excluded from union member-
ship solely on racial grounds."5 But here, Justice Minton contended that
whether the trainmen were required to represent the porters was by
statute committed to the National Mediation Board for resolution. Again,
for Justice Minton this was a question of power:
I do not understand that private parties such as the carrier
and the Brotherhood may not discriminate on the ground of
race. Neither a state government nor the Federal Government
may do so, but I know of no applicable federal law which says
that private parties may not. That is the whole problem under-
lying the proposed Federal Fair Employment Practices Code.
Of course, this Court by sheer power can say this case is Steele,
or even lay down a code of fair employment practices. But
83. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 484, 493-94 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
84. 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
85. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) ; see Note, Duty of Union
to Minority Groups in the Bargaining Unit, 65 HARv. L. REv. 490 (1952).
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sheer power is not a substitute for legality. I do not have to
agree with the discrimination here indulged in to question the
legality of today's decision.86
When the opportunity arose Justice Minton made clear his personal
feelings with respect to racial discrimination. In an opinion holding
unconstitutional a state court's award of contract damages for violation
of a racially restrictive covenant, he replied to contentions that no state
action was involved and that the white seller could not raise as a defense
the rights of those discriminated against:
The law will permit respondent to resist any effort to com-
pel her to observe such a covenant, so widely condemned by the
courts, since she is the one in whose charge and keeping reposes
the power to continue to use her property to discriminate or to
discontinue such use. The relation between the coercion ex-
erted on respondent and her possible pecuniary loss thereby is so
close to the purpose of the restrictive covenant, to violate the
constitutional rights of those discriminated against, that re-
spondent is the only effective adversary of the unworthy cove-
nant in its last stand. She will be permitted to protect herself
and, by so doing, close the gap to the use of this covenant, so
universally condemned by the courts."
The difficulty of these cases can perhaps be illustrated by turning
some of them over and looking at the other side. The white voters in
the Jaybird case, for example, were denied the privilege of discriminating
in quiet, orderly fashion, not as a result of a decision by those entrusted
with making policy in the State of Texas, but by virtue of the Court's
own interpretation of the Constitution, resulting in a decision which cuts
sharply into the political "freedoms" of these white individuals. At the
same time a strong minority would have required those in charge of
making policy in Illinois to permit Beauharnais to organize support for
his racial attacks against the same minority protected in the Jaybird case.
Such cases illustrate with striking clarity the truth of the reminder by
perhaps the most astute observer of the Court "of the difficulty of the
constitutional problem and of efforts to slip judicial votes into the tidy
categories of liberal and conservative.""8  Comparison of Justice Min-
ton's opinion in the Jaybird case with his decision in the restrictive cove-
86. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 778 (1952) (dis-
senting opinion).
87. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953).
88. FREUND, Mr. Justice Brandeis in MR. JUSTICE 97 (Dunham & Kurland eds.
1956).
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nant case, written less than two months later, demonstrates clearly that
in these matters Justice Minton made no attempt to be either "liberal" or
"conservative." He, as much as any other member of the Court, ap-
proached these questions not in terms of their social consequences, but
primarily as problems of power-the power of state and federal legisla-
tures under the Constitution. If his resolution of some of these prob-
lems is open to question, this is not attributable to the absence of intellec-
tual support for his conclusions but to the inherent difficulty of the
problems.
II. PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Often the ultimate outcome for an individual caught in the govern-
ment's far-flung net depends not so much upon interpretative or constitu-
tional niceties of the substantive law as upon his opportunity to present
his own case and to keep out damaging portions of the government's, to
have the facts and law determined by an impartial tribunal, and to obtain
review to correct erroneous determinations. Questions of this nature
made up an important part of the work of the Court during Justice Min-
ton's tenure, and his votes and opinions made a significant contribution
to the end product.
A. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL TRIALS
The principal function of a trial, criminal or otherwise, is to deter-
mine the whole truth legally relevant to the questions in dispute. Ac-
cordingly, in a criminal trial many of the procedural protections are de-
signed to insure, as far as possible, that an innocent suspect is not wrong-
fully convicted. But sometimes the search for truth may conflict with
other important policies, and some of the procedural problems in criminal
cases require reconciliation of these conflicts. Still other procedural
rules are unrelated either to the fairness of the trial or to any other im-
portant policy. Justice Minton was reluctant to upset convictions on
grounds which had no relation to, or did not cast substantial doubt upon,
the determination of the guilt of the accused. For example, he wrote
the Court's opinion holding that an indictment charging false testimony
before a Senate sub-committee need not contain the name or authority
of the officer who administered the oath to the defendant, since this
detail was not necessary fairly to advise the defendant of the nature of
the charge.89 Similarly, he wrote the opinion of the Court sustaining a
conviction in another case in which the U. S. District Attorney had pre-
89. United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374 (1953).
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sented the case to the grand jury without securing the approval of the
Attorney-General, as required by an unpublished order, on the ground
that this requirement was merely an internal housekeeping rule for the
Department of Justice and was not for the protection of the defendant."
Moreover, conceded errors in admission of evidence were not sufficient
to justify reversal of a conviction if the evidence so admitted could not
reasonably have affected the verdict, because in Justice Minton's words:
"A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one."91  Much
more common and more difficult than cases of this type were those
which raised substantial questions as to the fairness of the manner in
which the defendant was convicted or the means by which the evidence
against him was obtained.
1. Searches, Seizures and Wiretapping. Some of the difficult
questions which faced the Court required determination of the extent to
which the truth should be suppressed to restrict police state methods
which, once sanctioned, might be applied against the innocent as well as
the guilty. A logical and often effective method of securing evidence of
the guilt of a suspect is to search his home and office for incriminating
articles or documents, and failing in that, to eavesdrop on his conversa-
tions in the hope of overhearing damaging statements. Obviously, how-
ever, widespread use of such police methods would result in serious in-
vasions of the privacy of many innocent individuals, and even with re-
spect to guilty persons, unwarranted disclosure of private affairs un-
related to their criminal activity. Centuries of experience so convinced
the nation's founders of the great danger to a free people from un-
reasonable searches and seizures that they were forbidden by the fourth
amendment which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.92
The federal courts have enforced this prohibition by excluding evidence
wrongfully obtained,"2 though this rule of evidence was not inevitable
90. Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 (1954).91. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).
92. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
93. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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and is not followed in most states which apparently rely on other means
to enforce similar state prohibitions.94
In 1928 a closely divided Court held that wiretapping was not a
search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment.9" Sub-
sequently, Congress made it unlawful to "intercept" and "divulge" any
communication without the consent of the sender.96 In On Lee v. United
States97 Justice Minton joined the Court in upholding a conviction based
upon testimony of a federal agent of defendant's incriminating conver-
sation with a government "stool pigeon" who was "wired for sound"
with a radio transmitter which broadcast to the agent standing outside.
The dissenting justices thought this intrusion unconstitutional either as
a conventional search or as wiretapping, and Justice Frankfurter, demon-
strating his extreme revulsion for all such "dirty business," attacked the
action as exemplifying "lazy" police methods.9" It is difficult to see how
use of modern electronic equipment can fairly be characterized as lazy,
although its very ingenuity and proficiency may make it all the more
dangerous a threat to individual privacy.
The principal issue around which recent litigation involving the
fourth amendment has revolved is the extent to which federal police
may conduct a search without a warrant in connection with a valid ar-
rest. Two cases decided shortly before Justice Minton joined the Court
illustrate its difficulty with this problem. Harris v. United States99 up-
held a search of an entire four-room apartment even though the articles
seized were not what the officers were looking for. Justice Frank-
furter's dissent urged that read as a whole the amendment means that
any search without a warrant is unreasonable, and in a painstaking review
of the earlier cases, he rather persuasively argued that the right to search
pursuant to an arrest had been limited to the area within the defendant's
immediate control to enable the arresting officer to protect himself
against concealed weapons and to prevent the defendant from destroy-
ing evidence. For practical purposes the Harris decision was overruled
the following year in Trupiano v. United States... in which the Court
held that no search beyond the immediate physical control of the defend-
ant can be made without a search warrant if the arresting officers had
94. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29-33 (1949).
95. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
96. 48 Stat. 1104 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952).
97. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
98. Id. at 758-62 (dissenting opinion).
99. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
100. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
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time to procure one because the fourth amendment requires a warrant for
any search except when an emergency exists.
In United States v. Rabinowitz'0 1 Justice Minton wrote one of his
first important opinions. In this case a forger of overprinted stamps
was arrested in his small one-room office, whereupon the arresting offi-
cers conducted a thorough search of the premises without a search war-
rant and turned up 573 forged stamps which were used in evidence
against the defendant. Reversing the court of appeals and overruling
Trupiano, the Court sustained the conviction on the ground that the
search was reasonable because it was incident to a valid arrest, took place
in a small business room to which the public was invited, and uncovered
articles the possession of which constitutes a crime. Justice Frankfurter
rewrote his Harris dissent, adding a bitter and petulant protest against
instability in the law resulting from "unexpected changes in the Court's
composition and the contingencies in the choice of successors.''102
Justice Frankfurter's interpretation of the fourth amendment re-
quires making certain unexpressed exceptions to an otherwise absolute
express prohibition, although he himself has sharply criticized a similar
interpretation of the first amendment."' Once it is conceded that there
are exceptional circumstances which permit a search without a warrant,
then it seems clear that Justice Minton is correct in asserting that the
fourth amendment means just what it says-that only unreasonable
searches and seizures are prohibited. "That criterion in turn depends up-
on the facts and circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case,'' °
however "appealing from the vantage point of easy administration [may
be a] rule of thumb requiring that a search warrant always be procured
whenever practicable." ' 5  Justice Minton carefully based his opinion on
the combination of a number of factors all of which do have some bear-
ing on the seriousness of the police invasion of this defendant's privacy.
However fortuitous may be a suspect's location when he is arrested, con-
ducting a search entirely in his presence following a lawful entry to arrest
him is not as outrageous as unlawfully breaking down the door to con-
duct a general search for evidence or sneaking in surreptitiously to search
in his absence.0  Moreover, a man's home may be his castle, but his of-
101. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
102. Id. at 86 (dissenting opinion).
103. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (concurring opinion).
In fairness it should be noted that the "gloss of history" provides Justice Frankfurter
with a unifying principle.
104. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
105. Id. at 65.
106. Cf. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958) ; Miller v. United States, 357
U.S. 301 (1958) ; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
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fice to which he invites the public is certainly not so sacrosanct. Finally,
it is significant that this search was not a general search for evidence of
any crime, and the resulting seizure was limited to particular articles pos-
session of which constituted the crime for which the defendant was law-
fully arrested." 7 The Rabinowitz dissenters would impose a different
standard of reasonableness which may well be justified by the possibility
of police abuse of this authorization by using an arrest on a trumped-up
charge to justify rummaging through private papers for evidence of
other crimes or indiscretions. On the other hand such were not the facts
of this case, the result of which was not to sanction police interference
with an innocent person, but rather to protect all law-abiding citizens
from the threat of another guilty criminal. To secure this protection for
all of us, in Justice Minton's words: "Some flexibility will be accorded
law officers engaged in daily battle with criminals for whose restraint
criminal laws are essential."1 '
2. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. Perhaps the most logical
way for a government to secure information about any problem is to in-
terrogate those people most familiar with it. Accordingly, during the
post-war period many witnesses were called to testify before grand juries
and congressional committees conducting various investigations, the most
publicized of which were those inquiring into gambling and Communism.
A witness who refuses to answer pertinent' questions in such an inter-
rogation is ordinarily subject to conviction for contempt unless the
answer would incriminate him, in which case his refusal is permissible
under the provision of the fifth amendment that no person "shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.""'  Since the
witness cannot be compelled to disclose his guilt to justify his refusal to
answer, the witness himself is the principal judge of the validity of his
claim, which should be sustained if the general information available
makes it probable that the answer could be incriminating."'
During this period the Court reviewed a number of contempt con-
victions of witnesses who refused to answer questions concerning their
Communist activities and associations. The Court reversed the convic-
tion of a witness who claimed that she would incriminate herself by
answering questions concerning the Communist Party and her participa-
107. Cf. Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
108. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65 (1950).
109. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) ; United States v. Rumely,
345 U.S. 41 (1953).
110. U.S. CONsT. amend. V; see Note, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
in the Federal Courts, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1454 (1957).
111. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
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tion in it, since the answers sought might tend to establish Smith Act
violations. 1 On the other hand it sustained a similar conviction of a
witness who admitted her association with the Party but refused to
answer subsequent questions concerning her acquaintances in it." 8  The
Court reasoned that having admitted her association with the Party, the
answers to the subsequent questions could no longer incriminate her.
Justice Minton joined in both opinions, but he dissented in two subse-
quent decisions upsetting convictions of witnesses who had based their
refusal to answer in part at least on the ground that the first amendment
prohibited inquiries into associations and beliefs, and one of whom had
at one point expressly denied that his answer would incriminate him."4
These decisions undoubtedly made it more difficult to secure infor-
mation and criminal convictions relating to Communist activities, and
resulted in wide-spread misunderstanding and criticism of the privlege
against self-incrimination and the Court's application of it. The ob-
stacles to investigative committees could be and were surmounted by
enactment of an "Immunity Statute,""' authorizing the Attorney-General
to confer immunity from criminal prosecution on witnesses who testi-
fied, so that their testimony would no longer incriminate them. Justice
Minton joined in the Court's decision sustaining a contempt conviction
following granting of such immunity." 6
A corollary to this problem of the scope of the protection of the
privilege is the question of the inferences which may be drawn from a
claim of the privilege and the action which a government may take with
respect to a person making such a claim." 7  In Slowchower v. Board of
Higher Educ."s the Court held that New York could not automatically
discharge a teacher who claimed the privilege since to do so amounted to
a conclusive presumption that exercise of the privilege constituted either
an admission of guilt or commission of perjury. While the Court re-
fused to concede that any inference could be drawn with respect to the
conduct to which the question related from a claim of the privilege,"' a
successful route for the state was suggested by the dissenters in Slow-
chower, of whom Justice Minton was one, who urged that the discharge
112. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
113. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
114. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) ; Bart v. United States, 349
U.S. 219 (1955) ; cf. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (Supp. V, 1958).
116. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); see also Adams v. Maryland,
347 U.S. 179 (1954).
117. Compare GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955), with HooK, Com-
MON SENSE AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1957).
118. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
119. Id. at 557-59; see Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421 (1957).
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was justified by the teacher's refusal to cooperate with appropriate pub-
lic bodies.12 When New York subsequently adopted this suggestion, fol-
lowing Justice Minton's retirement a majority of the Court sustained the
discharge of a subway employee who claimed the privilege in refusing
to answer questions concerning his Communist affiliations.'
One outgrowth of the investigation of gambling was the enactment
of legislation requiring gamblers to register and pay a stamp tax. 2 After
this statute had been upheld with respect to a Pennsylvania gambler,'2 3
Justice Minton wrote the opinion for the Court sustaining it as applied to
a gambler in the District of Columbia. 2 Justices Black and Douglas
would have extended the protection of the privilege against self-
incrimination to this registration requirement, but Justice Minton cor-
rectly reasoned that since the act required registration before accepting
wagers, there was no compulsion on gamblers to give evidence against
themselves, and at the outset the gamblers were free to give up gambling
rather than registering.
3. Testimony of Informers. Not all criminals and ex-Communists
were as reluctant to talk about their experiences and associations as those
who pleaded the "Fifth Amendment." Some, influenced by a desire to
rectify past wrongs, to secure favorable treatment, or by other reasons
best known to themselves, willingly divulged everything they knew to the
authorities and, in some cases, to anyone who would listen or read. Oc-
casionally, as in On Lee, the Government went to considerable and ques-
tionable lengths to avoid relying on the testimony of informers, but be-
cause they were often in the best position to have obtained first-hand ob-
servations, in many proceedings important parts of the Government's
case consisted of such testimony. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly,
such witnesses were not always wholly reliable. The most notorious of
these was Harvey Matusow who publicly recanted his testimony, making
it difficult to determine which of his conflicting statements were true and
which false. Allegations of perjury by him and two others resulted in
remand to the Subversive Activities Control Board for further considera-
tion of an order determining the Communist Party to be a subversive
organization.' In a later decision which Justice Minton joined, but
which was rendered shortly after his retirement, the discovery of the un-
120. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 561-62, 566 (1956) (dis-
senting opinions). -
121. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
122. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4411.
123. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
124. Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
125. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115 (1956).
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reliability of another such witness resulted in a new trial for another
alleged Communist convicted under the Smith Act.1"
Suspecting or hoping that the evidence of such a witness might be
discredited, defense counsel naturally sought evidence of his prior state-
ments in conflict with his testimony. An obvious source of such con-
flicting statements was the witness' earlier reports and statements to the
Government. In a unanimous decision in Gordon v. United States'27 the
Court unanimously reversed the conviction of an alleged thief because the
Government's principal witness admitted that he had made prior conflict-
ing statements to the authorities which the trial court refused to direct
the Government to produce. After Justice Minton's retirement, the
Court rendered a similar decision in Jencks v. United States,2 ' directing
a new trial for an alleged Communist labor official because his counsel
had not been permitted to inspect FBI reports by Harvey Matusow and
another witness which defense counsel hoped were in conflict with their
testimony. Although in this case the witness had not admitted that the
FBI reports were conflicting, he had publicly disavowed his testimony,
so the decision directing the Government to produce these reports is a
reasonable application of the Gordon decision despite the extravagant as-
sertion by Justice Clark that the decision gave defendants a "Roman
holiday"... with FBI files.
The Jencks and Gordon decisions illustrate that an approach favor-
ing maximum development of the truth can operate in favor of the ac-
cused as well as against him. If at times the Court has gone too far in
protecting guilty defendants by excluding the truth, the remedy is cer-
tainly not to give the Government a corresponding power to hide a por-
tion of the truth which may be favorable to the accused.
In Bowinan Dairy Co. v. United States,' reversing the contempt
conviction of a Government attorney who had refused to obey an order
to produce certain materials, Justice Minton again indicated his prefer-
ence for production and admission of all relevant evidence. Justice Min-
ton's opinion held that one portion of the order was so broad that it con-
stituted an unwarranted "fishing expedition," but he went on to hold
that the subpoena was largely good, saying: "However, the plain words
of the Rule are not to be ignored. They must be given their ordinary
meaning to carry out the purposes of establishing a more liberal policy
for the production, inspection and use of materials at the trial . . In
126. Mesharosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956).
127. 344 U.S. 414 (1953).
128. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
129. Id. at 681 (dissenting opinion).
130. 341 U.S. 214 (1951).
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short, any document or other materials, admissible as evidence, obtained
by the Government by solicitation or voluntarily from third persons is
subject to subpoena."'31
4. Testimony of Spouses. Some exclusionary rules of evidence are
designed to carry out some public policy which, although not founded on
important constitutional protections, is thought to be sufficiently im-
portant to justify impeding the development of the truth. Such a rule is
the one that prohibits spouses from testifying against each other in order
to preserve their happy home." 2  Much of the evidence in Lutwak v.
United States, 33 the facts of which resemble a Hollywood bedroom com-
edy script, consisted of testimony by so-called spouses against each other.
Munio Knoll, his wife Maria, and his brother Leopold, were aliens who
secured entry into this country under the War Brides Act" by going
through the form of marriage ceremonies with three veterans of the ap-
propriate sexes, apparently following a divorce between Munio and
Maria. Justice Minton held the testimony admissible on the grounds that
at least in this case the reason for the rule did not exist because there
were no happy homes to protect, whether or not the parties were tech-
nically married. Since there was no criminal violation at all if the parties
were "spouses" within the meaning of the War Brides Act, this decision
also presented a classic example of the puzzling problem which arises
when the evidentiary question coincides with the ultimate question on the
merits. Although the dissent urged that a conviction based upon such
testimony was pulled up by its own bootstraps, it seems clear that the
trial court must ordinarily make a separate determination with respect to
the admission of the evidence, whatever the ultimate determination of the
qame question on the merits."'
The issue in another case was whether a witness could refuse to
answer questions as to his wife's whereabouts on the ground that his
knowledge was obtained through a confidential communication from his
wife."' On the facts of this case, in light of prior authority, the Court
appears to have been correct in holding that the witness was privileged to
refuse to answer the question because the Government offered no proof
to rebut the usual presumption that communications between spouses are
privileged," 7 particularly since in this case it appeared that the wife was
131. Id. at 220-21.
132. See 8 WlalORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2227-45 (3d ed. 1940); Hawkins v. United
States, 79 Sup. Ct. 136 (1958).
133. 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
134. 59 Stat. 659 (1945).
135. Cf. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE COMMON SENSE AND COmMON LAw 211-20 (1947).
136. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
137. See S WIGBORE, EVIDENCE § 2336 (3d ed. 1940).
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hiding out from the authorities. Dissenting, Justice Minton again re-
vealed his preference for developing the truth to competing policies, rea-
soning that: "The general rule of evidence is competency, incompetency
is the exception and to bring one within the exception, one must come
within the reason for the exception."'3 s
5. Joint Trials. Prosecutors frequently resort to the expedient of
joint trials, particularly for conspiracy defendants. Justice Minton's
opinion in the Lutwak case demonstrates the difficult evidentiary and
procedural problems inherent in such trials. Evidence at this trial for
conspiracy to defraud the United States by securing wrongful entry into
the United States under the War Brides Act included testimony by var-
ious participants of both acts performed and statements made before and
after the conclusion of the conspiracy. Justice Minton carefully distin-
guished between acts and declarations, pointing out that the former pre-
sented no hearsay problem and hence were admissible against all defend-
ants even though performed after the conspiracy had ended. Statements
made during the course of the conspiracy were admissible against all of
the defendants under a well-accepted exception to the hearsay rule for
statements of a party on the theory that each co-conspirator is an agent
of the others." 9 But statements made after the termination of the con-
spiracy were admissible only against the defendant who made them since
the agency was then terminated. Although the trial court carefully in-
structed the jury with respect to the particular defendant against whom
such testimony was admissible, it is obviously difficult for the jury to
keep these nice distinctions in mind. Nevertheless the Court, adhering to
earlier decisions, 4 ° sustained the convictions, refusing to hold that this
procedure is unfair as long as the jury is properly instructed. The Court
subsequently relied heavily on this opinion in a recent 5-4 decision uphold-
ing similar convictions obtained at a joint trial.'' The Lutwak decision
again illustrates Justice Minton's preference for full development of the
truth since, as had previously been pointed out by Judge Learned Hand,
"In effect, however, the rule probably furthers, rather than impedes,
the search for truth, and this probably excuses the device which satisfies
form while it violates substance; that is, the recommendation to the jury
138. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 335 (1951) (dissenting opinion); cf.
Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
139. 4 WMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1079 (3d ed. 1940).
140. E.g, Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947).
141. Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957) ; cf. Pereira v. United States,
347 U.S. 1 (1954).
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of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but any-
body's else."' 4 2
6. Biased Juries and Judges. No evidentiary rules or constitutional
protections are sufficient to insure a defendant a fair trial if the tribunal
judging his case is prejudiced against him. To assure an impartial jury,
a potential juror should be excluded not only if he is actually biased but
also if his relationship to the case is such as to make it difficult or un-
likely that he could be disinterested. The Court had earlier decided that
federal government employees were not inherently disqualified from act-
ing as jurors in federal criminal cases. 43 In the Dennis case, on appeal
from a contempt conviction, a notorious Communist urged that the situa-
tion was different with respect to him, particularly in light of Govern-
ment loyalty and security orders which would be likely to make Govern-
ment employees fearful of their jobs if they should find in his favor. He
offered no proof of his conclusion, and in fact, when questioned, the
jurors indicated they felt no fear for their jobs. Justice Minton's opinion
for the Court sustained the conviction, refusing to assume without proof
that all Government employees were so likely to fear for their jobs that
they should automatically be excluded. He conceded that the right of a
member of an unpopular minority to an impartial trial must be scrupu-
lously protected to the same extent as any other defendant. In his words:
In exercising its discretion, the trial court must be zealous
to protect the rights of an accused. And we agree that this the
court must do without reference to an accused's political or re-
ligious beliefs, however such beliefs may be received by a pre-
dominant segment of our population. Ideological status is not
an appropriate gauge of the high standard of justice toward
which our courts may not be content only to strive. But while
one of an unpopular minority group must be accorded that
solicitude which properly accompanies an accused person, he is
not entitled to unusual protection or exception. 44
But he concluded with a ringing affirmation of his faith in the funda-
mental fairness and integrity of the men and women of whom juries are
composed:
In this case, no more than the trial court can we without
injustice take judicial notice of a miasma of fear to which
142. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).
143. Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948); United States v. Wood, 299
U.S. 123 (1936).
144. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 168 (1950).
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Government employees are claimed to be peculiarly vulnerable-
and from which other citizens are by implication immune.
Vague conjecture does not convince that Government employees
are so intimidated that they cringe before their Government in
fear of investigation and loss of employment if they do their
duty as jurors, which duty this same Government has imposed
upon them. There is no disclosure in this record that these
jurors did not bring to bear, as is particularly the custom when
personal liberty hinges on the determination, the sense of re-
sponsibility and individual integrity by which men judge men. 1
Where, however, the circumstances demonstrated that a juror wa.
in fact subject to pressure which- would make disinterested consideratiol,
difficult, Justice Minton was insistent that fairness required exclusioi,
of the juror. In the Remmer case he wrote the Court's opinion vacatin,.
the defendant's conviction so the district court could determine whethc,
an alleged FBI investigation of a juror who had reported a bribery at
tempt had prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial, saying:
In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or
tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial
about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious rea-
sons, deemed presumptively prejudicial ...
' * * The sending of an F.B.I. agent in the midst of a trial
to investigate a juror as to his conduct is bound to impress th(
juror and is very apt to do so unduly. A juror must feel fre(
to exercise his functions without the F.B.I. or anyone else look-
ing over his shoulder. The integrity of jury proceedings must
not be jeopardized by unauthorized invasions . . . "'
After the district court decided that the defendant had not been prejtii
diced, Justice Minton once more wrote for a unanimous Court. reversin.
the conviction and reiterating his previous views in the following word,
We think this evidence, covering the total picture, reveals
such a state of facts that neither Mr. Smith nor anyone could
say he was not affected in his freedom of action as a juror. ...
He had been subjected to extraneous influences to which no
juror should be subjected, for it is the law's objective to guard
jealously the sanctity of the jury's right to operate as freely as
145. Id. at 172.
146. Renmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) : cf. Remington v. Unih,0
States, 343 U.S. 907 (1952).
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possible from outside unauthorized intrusions purposefully
made.' 7
He was not so insistent on the disinterestedness of a judge holding
-i lawyer in contempt for conduct committed before him. In Sacher v.
United States.4 the Court sustained such a conviction of one of the at-
torneys who represented the defendants in the trial in the Dennis case.
However, in a similar case two years later the Court reversed a contempt
,onviction by an obviously prejudiced judge so that the charge could be
heard by another judge. 4 Justice Minton dissented on the ground that
the lawyer was obviously guilty and the two day punishment was not un-
fair. He subsequently joined in a dissent to a decision upsetting a simi-
lar state court conviction.' Justices Black and Douglas insisted in the
first two cases that the defendant was not only entitled to have this judge
lisqualified but was also entitled to a jury trial, a contention which they
have continued to maintain and which came close to prevailing last term
despite the unswerving authority to the contrary.1 1' Conceding the im-
portance of empowering a judge to maintain order in his court, it is dif-
ficult to agree with Justice Minton's refusal to apply the same standards
4)f fairness and freedom from bias to a judge in such a case as he applied
to the juror in the Returer case. However apparent the guilt of the ac-
cused, fundamental fairness and the integrity of the judicial system re-
luire that he be tried and sentenced by an impartial tribunal.
The foregoing cases demonstrate clearly that in approaching evi-
dentiary problems, Justice Minton's general preference was for the pro-
duction and admission of all relevant evidence. At least in the absence
of competing considerations, few except guilty defendants and their at-
torneys can quarrel with a policy of encouraging the development of the
entire relevant truth. The same cannot be said, however, with respect
to his refusal to accord to contempt defendants the same right to have the
truth determined by an impartial tribunal as he insisted upon for de-
fendants in a jury trial.
7. Courts-Martial Jurisdiction and Review. American servicemen,
thousands of whom have been joined by their wives and other depend-
ents, are stationed in over 60 countries throughout the world.' Both
the power and the necessity to permit the military to deal with violations
147. Reuner v. United States, 350 U.S. 377, 381-82 (1956); see also Gold v.
United States, 352 U.S. 985 (1957).
148. 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
149. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
150. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
151. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
152. See Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 473 (1956).
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by armed services personnel in a manner different from ordinary crimi-
nal violations is unquestioned. Recently the Court has had to consider
whether some civilians can also be tried before some such special type
of tribunal.
In one case Justice Minton joined the opinion of the Court holding
that United States occupation courts in Germany created by presidential
order had concurrent jurisdiction with military courts-martial to try an
Army wife accused of murdering her soldier husband.153 But in a sub-
sequent case the Court held that a discharged soldier could not constitu-
tionally be tried by courts-martial for an offense committed while he was
in the Army."' Justice Minton joined in a dissent based on the ground
that power to provide for such a trial was conferred on Congress by vir-
tue of its power with respect to "the land and naval forces." 5' Cases of
this type are excepted from at least some of the procedural requirements
of the fifth and sixth amendments. Justice Minton added his own dissent
on the further ground that in view of the fact that the defendant's dis-
charge was subject to the provisions of the statute expressly permitting
such a court-martial, to that limited extent he was not a full-fledged
civilian.
A few months later Justice Minton was again with the majority
when the Court held that a military court-martial could constitutionally
try two Army wives accused of murdering their husbands in England
and Japan. 5' But in the term following Justice Minton's retirement, the
Court granted rehearing and reversed itself, holding that at least in capital
cases, courts-martial could not exercise jurisdiction over such civilians. 5 7
In Hiatt v. Brown, ' relying on much earlier decisions, the Court
held that review of courts-martial convictions by habeas corpus was
limited to determining whether the military tribunal had jurisdiction and
did not extend to the correction of errors. The Court subsequently relied
on this decision in Burns v. Wilson,"' while at the same time apparently
broadening the scope of review, holding that where a court-martial gave
full consideration to the defendants' constitutional contentions, review
by federal courts on habeas corpus does not extend to the correctness of
the court-martial's conclusions. Justice Minton concurred on the ground
that review was limited solely to the question of jurisdiction and that:
153. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
154. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
155. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8 and amend. V and VI.
156. Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956); Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956).
157. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
158. 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
159. 346 U.S. 137 (1953), rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 844 (1953).
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"Due process of law for military personnel is what Congress has pro-
vided for them in the military hierarchy in courts established according
to law."'6 0 Justices Black and Douglas dissented on the ground that the
defendants had established a prima facie case that their convictions were
based on coerced confessions, a claim which they regarded as reviewable
as "jurisdictional." As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in urging that
the case be reargued, similar expansion of the meaning of "jurisdiction"
had earlier been utilized to permit broad review in habeas corpus proceed-
ings involving civilian criminal convictions.1"'
Underlying all of these decisions is the question of the extent to
which military personnel and persons closely associated with them are
constitutionally entitled to certain of the procedural protections clearly
available to most criminal defendants. In the court-martial cases, justice
Minton voted to sustain the power of the Government to subject to mili-
tary jurisdiction civilians closely related to the military, and to limit re-
view of such convictions solely to such questions of jurisdiction on the
ground that judicial power to deal with defendants properly subjected to
courts-martial jurisdiction is conferred elsewhere than the federal civilian
courts.
B. FEDERAL LIMIITATIONS ON STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES
In the exercise of its general supervisory powers over federal courts
and law enforcement officials, the Supreme Court has considerable dis-
cretion in fashioning rules of procedure for the protection of an accused
in a federal criminal trial.'62 But in reviewing state criminal convictions,
its function is ordinarily limited to determining whether the conviction
was obtained by state procedures so fundamentally unfair as to constitute
a denial of due process, or occasionally of some other constitutionally
protected right. Due process is by its nature a flexible concept dependent
to a large extent upon the facts of each particular case. Most of the
principal disputes, however, fall into one or more of a very few familiar
patterns.
1. Right to Counsel. In many cases most criminal defendants are
incapable of dealing with the complex legal questions which their defense
may entail without the aid of counsel. The Court has held that all fed-
eral criminal defendants are entitled to representation by counsel by vir-
tue of the sixth amendment which provides in part that "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance
160. Id. at 147 (concurring opinion).
161. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
162. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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of Counsel for his defence."16  However, it has refused to lay down a
universal rule that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
requires appointment of counsel in all state criminal proceedings, a great
many of which involve relatively minor violations of which the defendant
is admittedly guilty. Hence, the Court has required appointment of
counsel only in capital cases164 and cases in which special circumstances,
such as the extreme youth of the defendant, renders fundamentally un-
fair a conviction obtained without representation by counsel. 6
While the Court has usually been in general agreement in applying
this principle, occasional differences have arisen, as is illustrated by the
5-4 decision in Palmer v. Ashe"6 in which Justice Minton wrote the mi-
nority's dissent. In this case the petitioner did not raise his claim until
more than eighteen years after having been sentenced, and following his
parole and subsequent incarceration for parole violation. The special cir-
cumstances alleged included his youth, irresponsibility and mental in-
competency, but rested primarily on his claim that he had been deliberately
misinformed as to the crime with which he was charged and to which he
had pleaded guilty. The dissenting opinion pointed out that he was 21
when he was sentenced, and that his claim of incompetency was based on
his confinement in a mental institution more than ten years before that.
Justice Minton reasoned that the state could reasonably conclude "that
his contention, made eighteen years late, that he had pleaded guilty to
crimes other than he thought he was pleading to was a bit hard to believe,
especially in the absence of an allegation that he did not commit the of-
fenses charged in the indictments to which he pleaded guilty."' 67
Justice Minton's dual reliance on the length of time until the claim
was made and the uncontested guilt of the petitioner was crystallized in
his dissent in a subsequent 5-4 decision granting post-conviction relief
for lack of counsel to a federal prisoner whose trial had taken place
twelve years earlier and who still made no claim of innocence.6' In
Justice Minton's words, in part characteristically understandable to the
litigant:
(N) or does he suggest how a lawyer might have helped
him unless he picked the lock on the jailhouse door.
163. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
164. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
165. E.g., Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
166. 342 U.S. 134 (1951). Compare Cash v. Culver, 79 Sup. Ct. 432 (1959), Moore
v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957), Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116
(1956), Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954), and Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3
(1953), with Quicksall v. Michigan, 337 U.S. 660 (1950).
167. Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134, 142 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
168. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
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The important principle that means for redressing depri-
vations of constitutional rights should be available often clashes
with the also important principle that at some point a judg-
ment should become final-that litigation must eventually come
to an end."'
Due process imposes very few limits on the broad discretion of a
state trial judge in sentencing a criminal defendant. For example, the
judge can rely on confidential information outside the record in impos-
ing sentence.' Nevertheless, the special circumstances which render un-
fair a conviction without counsel may arise by virtue of mistaken as-
sumptions or patent injudiciousness by the trial judge in imposing sen-
tence.' This is illustrated by the Court's per curiam reversal in Foulke v.
Burke 1"2 of a Pennsylvania decision upholding facetious sentencing by a
Pennsylvania trial judge. Justice Minton alone dissented, arguing that
there was no denial of due process so long as the sentence was within
authorized limits. He urged that:
These cases only illuminate the error of this Court in
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736. I would not compound the
error. I would overrule Townsend rather than send these peti-
tioners back to be proceeded against nicely. Their guilt is not
questioned. They say, 'If we had only had a lawyer, maybe we
would not have received such long sentences.' Yet, the sentenc-
ing judge gave two of the petitioners much shorter terms than
the maximum provided by statute. They complain not so much
of the sentences they received but the manner in which they
received them.
Admit the sentencing judge was facetious, even that he
bulldozed the petitioners-he sentenced them all within the
limits authorized by law. Maybe the judge's conduct called for
a curtain lecture. At most, that was a matter for the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, and that court did not see even an error
of state law in the judge's conduct, let alone a federal constitu-
tional question. We sit only to determine federal constitutional
questions, not to scold state trial judges. It is utterly incom-
prehensible to me how a judge can commit a denial of federal
due process by being facetious in the sentencing of defendants
169. Id. at 516-17, 520 (dissenting opinion).
170. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
171. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
172. 342 U.S. 881 (1952).
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where the sentences he imposes are within the limits prescribed
by statute. I would affirm.173
This short memorandum opinion illustrates again three aspects of Justice
Minton's approach to review of state criminal proceedings: (1) his gen-
eral reluctance to interfere with the exercise of state power, consistent,
for example, with his opinion in a subsequent case sustaining a state con-
viction based on wiretapped evidence;... (2) his hesitancy to upset state
convictions for lack of counsel in the absence of a claim of innocence,
revealed also, for example, in his dissent in Palmer v. Ashe, which upset
an 18 year old state conviction; and (3) his reluctance to interfere with
the discretion of a trial court, manifested elsewhere, for example, in his
dissent in Offutt v. United States,"75 which reversed an attorney's con-
tempt conviction by an obviously prejudiced judge. While most would
agree in principle with Justice Minton's unwillingness to interfere with
the broad discretion properly conferred upon trial judges, or to inquire
into the judge's mental processes in exercising that discretion, neverthe-
less fundamental fairness would seem to require that the sentencing court
act with apparent dispassion.
2. Coerced Confessions. Just as for federal officers and investiga-
tors, one of the simplest and most effective methods for state and local
police to secure evidence against a criminal suspect is to question him in-
tensively. Frequently, a confession is obtained after such prolonged in-
terrogation that it is questionable whether or not the confession was
made voluntarily. Often the defendant will subsequently repudiate his
confession claiming that it was phychologically coerced, or occasionally
that it was secured through actual physical brutality. Admission of such
a confession is subject to attack on several grounds. In the first place it
is secured without the suspect having had the opportunity to consult with
counsel. Often it is obtained while he is being illegally detained without
having been brought before a magistrate and charged as required by local
law. Moreover, forcing a suspect to give evidence against himself vio-
lates the principle underlying the privilege against self-incrimination.
Most fundamental of all, a confession which is in fact coerced is at the
same time so damaging and yet so unreliable that it is prejudicially un-
fair to admit it in evidence against him. The Court has held that the
privilege against self-incrimination is not one of the fundamental rights
173. Id. at 881 (dissenting opinion).
174. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 195 (1952).
175. 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
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"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"' 6 made applicable to the States
by the fourteenth amendment, although the contrary position was con-
tinued in dissent in other cases. 7 In another decision in which Justice
Minton joined, the Court likewise sustained a conviction based upon a
confession obtained while the defendant was being illegally detained,
where there was no evidence that it was involuntary.' 8 Perhaps the dis-
senting view of Justices Black and Douglas would result in better, more
efficient, state police methods, but this is a question for the states, not
the Court, to decide. The only question for the Court in such a case is
whether this defendant's conviction was obtained witlout due process of
law, and there is nothing fundamentally unfair in convicting an admit-
tedly guilty man on the basis of his own voluntary confession.
Even the defendant's claim that his confession was actually coerced
does not end the matter, for this claim will usually be disputed by the
police, thus giving rise to a difficult factual issue. The Court has ex-
ercised considerable latitude in making an independent judgment with
respect to the voluntary nature of the confession.' In Leyra v. Denno80
the Court held involuntary as a matter of law three confessions obtained
within a space of a few hours after a confession admittedly coerced by a
psychiatrist. Justice Minton dissented on the ground that there was
enough evidence to support the voluntary nature of these confessions that
it could not be concluded as a matter of law that they were involuntary.
Perhaps the key to the Court's opinion in the Leyra case lies in its
emphasis on the fact that the challenged confessions were obtained "from
a lone defendant unprotected by counsel." " ' It is certainly true that a
defendant may often have more need for counsel immediately after his
arrest and when interrogation is commenced than at any other time. But
as long as there is no coercion, physical or mental, a conviction based
upon a voluntary confession hardly seems a denial of due process, even
though with a lawyer's counsel at the outset many guilty criminals might
be able to avoid conviction. Thus, in two decisions following Justice
Minton's retirement, a closely divided Court refused to upset convictions
176. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) ; see Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357
U.S. 371 (1958) ; cf. Regan v. New York, 349 U.S. 58 (1955).
177. E.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 56, 197-98 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
178. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1952); see Stroble v. California, 343 U.S.
181 (1953).
179. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949). Compare Fikes v. Alabama,
352 U.S. 191 (1957), and Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958), with Thomas v. Ari-
zona, 356 U.S. 390 (1958), and Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
180. 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
181. Id. at 561.
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solely because confessions were obtained after the suspect was refused
his request for counsel.182
3. Illegally Obtained Evidence. Like federal officers, state and lo-
cal police faced with the difficult task of solving a multitude of crimes
occasionally resort to searching the premises of a suspect in the hope,
often realized, of finding evidence against him. Although such evidence
may have been obtained by means which would constitute an unlawful
search and seizure if conducted by federal officers, it was held in TVolf v.
Colorado..3 that there is ordinarily no constitutional bar to its admission
as evidence in a state court. Unlike coerced confessions there is no cloud
upon its trustworthiness, and while its admission may encourage lawless
action by state law enforcement officers, this problem, like that of illegal
detention, is committed to the states and not to the federal courts.
However, as demonstrated by Rochin v. California,8 in which Jus-
tice Minton did not participate, most rules have their limits. When police
officers broke into his room, Rochin hastily snatched two capsules con-
taining narcotics from a table and swallowed them. The capsules were
recovered by administration of an emitic which forced him to vomit and
entered in evidence at his trial. The Court held unanimously, Justices
Black and Douglas each concurring separately, that Rochin's conviction
based upon such "stomach-pumped" evidence violated due process because
such police methods "shock the conscience '  and "offend the com-
munity's sense of fair play and decency."' 6  In light of two subsequent
cases, the precise limits of this case are difficult to determine. A narrow
majority, in which Justice Minton joined, refused to apply it in sustain-
ing a conviction based on evidence obtained by "bugging" the defendant's
bedroom for an extended period.'87 Although this case can be distin-
guished from Rochin in that no physical assault was involved, Justice
Frankfurter, the author of the Rochin opinion, appears correct in assert-
ing in his dissent that the police conduct here was just as aggravated as
in Rochin. Such deliberate and prolonged eavesdropping in many ways
poses a far more serious threat to individual liberty and privacy than
"stomach pumping" in unforeseen and unforeseeable circumstances. In
still another case decided after Justice Minton retired, the Court sus-
tained a drunken driving conviction based on a blood sample taken from
182. Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) ; Cropper v. California, 357 U.S. 433
(1958).
183. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Compare Steffanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951),
with Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
184. 342 U.S. 165 (1953).
185. Id. at 172.
186. Id. at 173.
187. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
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the driver while unconscious."8' Although the physical assault involved
in this case was less aggravated than in Rochin, three justices thought this
difference in degree was not great enough to distinguish it.
A closely related problem is that of evidence obtained by wire-
tapping, the disclosure of which is prohibited by federal statute, although
wiretapping itself is not a search forbidden by the fourth amendment.'
Since under Wolf v. Colorado evidence obtained by unconstitutional
means is admissible in state courts, it is scarcely surprising that the Court,
in an opinion by Justice Minton in Schwartz v. Texas, 0 sustained a state
court conviction based upon wiretapped evidence. The problem is not
quite as simple as it appears on the surface, however, since the wire-
tapping statute, unlike the fourth amendment, does not prohibit the inva-
sion by itself, but makes it unlawful to wiretap and disclose the contents
of the intercepted message.' In Nardone v. United States"'9 wiretapped
evidence was excluded in federal courts on the ground that testimony of
wiretapped evidence in a federal court would constitute an unlawful dis-
closure, reasoning apparently applicable to state courts as well. But Jus-
tice 'Minton relegated l'ardone to a rule of evidence analogous to the
S'ecks v. United States"' rule (excluding evidence obtained in violation
,if the fourth amendment from use in federal prosecutions), which by
analogy to Wolf v. Colorado was inapplicable in the Court's review of
-tate proceedings.
The key to Justice Minton's position in these cases is revealed in the
;,,llowing passage from his opinion in the Schwartz case:
Where a state has carefully legislated so as not to render
inadmissible evidence obtained and sought to be divulged in)
violation of the laws of the United States, this Court will not
extend by implication the statute of the United States so as to
invalidate the specific language of the state statute. If Con-
gress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its in-
tention clearly. It will not be presumed that a federal statute
was intended to supersede the exercise of the power of the state
unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The
exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed.'
188. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
189. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
190. 344 U.S. 195 (1952).
191. 48 Stat. 1104 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952).
192. 302 U.S. 379 (1937) ; see Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
193. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
194. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 195, 202-03 (1952) : cf. Adams v. Maryland, 347
U.S. 179 (1954).
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This language, strikingly similar to the views of the dissenters (includ-
ing Justice Minton) in the Nelson case, who would have sustained Penn-
sylvania's sedition act, demonstrates quite clearly Justice Minton's re-
luctance to interfere with the exercise of state power.
4. Appeals. In a unique extension of the requirements of due pro-
cess and equal protection the Court held in Griffin v. Illinois9 . that a
state may not deny appellate review of a criminal conviction because of
the defendant's inability to pay for a trial transcript. The Court rea-
soned that although due process does not require providing any appeal at
all, it is arbitrary to provide an appeal on terms not available to indigents.
To the majority it was clear that: "In criminal trials a State can no
more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion,
race or color. . . There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial
a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." '  But to Justice
Minton and Justice Burton, writing for themselves and two others, it
was equally clear that:
It is one thing for Congress and this Court to prescribe such
procedure for the federal courts. It is quite another for this
Court to hold that the Constitution of the United States has
prescribed it for all state courts.
. . . Illinois is not bound to make the defendants economically
equal before its bar of justice. For a State to do so may be a
desirable social policy, but what may be a good legislative policy
for a State is not necessarily required by the Constitution of
the United States. Persons charged with crimes stand before
the law with varying degrees of economic and social advantage.
Some can afford better lawyers and better investigations of
their cases. Some can afford bail, some cannot. Why fix bail
at any reasonable sum if a poor man can't make it?
The Constitution requires the equal protection of the law,
but it does not require the States to provide equal financial
means for all defendants to avail themselves of such laws.
• This is an interference with state power for what
may be a desirable result, but which we believe to be within the
field of local option.117
195. 351 U.S. 12 (1956); see also Eskridge v. Washington State Bd., 357 U.S.
214 (1958).
196. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17, 19 (1956).
197. Id. at 27-29 (dissenting opinion).
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This case was more favorable for the petitioners than those involving
illegally obtained evidence, for example, since the majority was not lim-
ited to the due process clause but could rely in part on the equal protec-
tion clause in light of the resulting discrimination between rich and poor.
As Justice Harlan's separate dissent points out, however, the law is full
of differentiations based on wealth, not all of them weighted against the
poor."'8 But there is considerable appeal in the majority's position that
at least in criminal cases, the capacity to exercise the basic steps in one's
defense ought not to depend on his financial status, even though the ef-
fectiveness of that exercise may still necessarily depend on the amount
of money he can expend in his defense. This case illustrates perhaps as
clearly as any the difficulties inherent in the multitude of cases before
the Court requiring it to reconcile the claimed procedural rights of crimi-
nal defendants with the power left to the states under the Constitution.
5. Double Jeopardy. In Brock v. North Carolina 9 Justice Minton
wrote the Court's opinion holding that the defendant was not denied due
process by a conviction at a second trial following the declaration of a
mistrial at the first trial when two of the state's principal witnesses, al-
legedly co-participants in the crime, refused to testify on grounds of self-
incrimination. The following passage from his opinion illustrates Jus-
tice Minton's approach to all these cases involving the requirements of
due process in state criminal cases:
As in all cases involving what is or is not due process, so
in this case, no hard and fast rule can be laid down. The pat-
tern of due process is picked out in the facts and circumstances
of each case. The pattern here, long in use in North Carolina,
does not deny the fundamental essentials of a trial, 'the very
essence of a scheme of ordered justice,' which is due process."'
This decision was recently relied upon by the Court in holding there
was no denial of due process in convicting a defendant of robbery al-
though he had been acquitted at an earlier trial for allegedly robbing
other persons at the same time.2 '
The law of most states confers on an accused rights which, if he is
fully aware of them and exercises them intelligently, make it virtually im-
possible for a state to obtain evidence of his guilt from perhaps the most
fruitful source, the suspect himself. Several justices appear to have
198. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1, 2001.
199. 344 U.S. 424 (1953).
200. Id. at 427-28.
201. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958) ; cf. Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571
(1958) ; Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
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taken the position that any conviction based upon information obtained
from the defendant violates due process unless he knowingly waives
these rights. This is consistent with the position of at least some of
them that the privilege against self-incrimination is made applicable to
the states by the due process clause.2"2 It is manifested in the position of
a minority of the Court that a conviction, based on a confession obtained
after the defendant had been denied his request to confer with counsel,
violates due process."'
Justice Minton, and in most instances a majority of the Court, at-
tacked these problems differently. Fundamental to his approach to all
such cases was his strong aversion to interfering with the states' ad-
ministration of criminal justice, especially when the defendant made no
claim to innocence. Justice Minton and the majority of the Court were
I believe, correct in ordinarily refusing to interfere with state court pro-
cedures in the name of civil liberties. For example, to me there is noth-
ing fundamentally abhorrent about convicting a guilty man at a fairli
conducted trial on the basis of reliable evidence merely because that evi-
dence was obtained in violation of state law. This would be a bettei
world if all police officers behaved as they should, but so also would it
be better if there were no criminals. The Constitution does not guaran-
tee Utopia in either respect. Rochin, one of the few cases decided in thc
defendant's favor, represents a rejection of the thought underlying Jus-
tice Stone's assertion that "a criminal prosecution is more than a game ir,
which the Government may be checkmated and the game lost merely be-
cause its officers have not played according to rule."20 4  If Rochin had
been a gentleman he would have submitted docilely when caught with the
goods. It was his refusal to abide by the rules which necessitated the
drastic counter-action taken by the police in unforeseeable circumstances
Requiring a state, willing to rely on other devices to improve its police
methods, to free Rochin from conviction for a crime of which he was
so obviously guilty may well "shock the conscience" of a good many ordi-
nary citizens subjected to further invasions by an admittedly guilty crimi-
nal set free to prey once more.
III. FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATION OF COMMERCE
Although decisions of the Court in the last twenty years broadly in-
terpreting the constitutional power of Congress to regulate "Commercc
202. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
203. Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958); Cropper v. California, 357 U.S. 433
(1958).
204. McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 (1927).
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with foreign Nations, and among the several States"2"5 have encouraged
Congress to regulate important aspects of business in great detail, there
remain many areas in which Congress has not acted to the full extent of
its power. Thus, in recent years most of the cases in which the applica-
bility of federal regulation has been challenged have not been constitu-
tional decisions, but instead have involved interpretation of the scope of
the regulatory legislation enacted by Congress. Similar state legislation
designed to supplement such federal regulation is often challenged on
the ground that Congress intended its regulation to be exclusive or that
the state legislation conflicts with Congressional regulation. Determin-
ing the applicable limits of such federal and state regulation presented the
Court with a number of difficult problems.
A. REGULATION OF CARRIERS
The Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act imposes
liability for damage to goods in transit upon a carrier "receiving property
for transportation from a point in one state . . . to a point in another
state. ' '2 16  Justice Minton wrote the Court's opinion holding that the
amendment applied to a shipment from New Orleans to Boston, even
though the goods had first been shipped on an ocean bill of lading from
Buenos Aires to New Orleans. 207 Conceding the possibility that for some
purposes the shipment from New Orleans to Boston might be viewed as
part of "an organic transaction in [foreign] commerce," 28 Justice Min-
ton pointed out that the original shipment ended at New Orleans under
the terms of the initial bill of lading, and concluded, therefore, that for
purposes of the Carmack Amendment the subsequent shipment was a
separate one to which the literal language of the statute clearly applied.
Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that this literal interpretation
was contrary to the "illuminating context of the regulatory scheme."2 '
Following a series of restrictive court decisions with respect to the
scope of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, in 1939 Congress amended
it to apply to "any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such
employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or
shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially affect such com-
merce.. . ."2 In two cases Justice Minton wrote the Court's opinion
holding that by virtue of the amendment, the Act now applied to an em-
205. U.S. CONST. art. I, § S.
206. 34 Stat. 595 (1908), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1952).
207. Reider v. Thompson, 339 U.S. 113 (1950).
20S. Id. at 119 (dissenting opinion).
209. Id. at 120 (dissenting opinion).
210. 35 Stat 65 (1908), as amended, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952).
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ployee engaged in the construction of new railroad cars211 and to a blue-
print file clerk.2 12 Justice Minton concluded that the duties of such em-
ployees "furthered" and "closely and substantially" affected the rail-
road's interstate transportation operations. He rejected the contention
that the coverage of the Act should be limited to employees engaged in
transportation, since the language of the Act contained no such limita-
tion. Again Justice Frankfurter dissented, protesting against literal in-
terpretation of a statute as if it were "merely a collection of words for
abstract annotation out of the dictionary"2 ' rather than "an organism,
projected into the future out of its past."2 14  These cases illustrate not
so much varying approaches to Congressional regulation of commerce as
differing views with respect to the manner of interpreting apparently
unambiguous statutes generally, differences manifested in many other
cases.
Perhaps a clearer indication of the broad scope which Justice Minton
accorded to the Interstate Commerce Act is contained in his dissenting
vote from a 5-4 decision holding that an interstate carrier could be re-
quired to obtain an Arkansas permit before operating on the state's
highways.1 The dissenters urged that such a state permit was in reality
a certificate of convenience and necessity within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the ICC under the federal statute.
Where federal regulation was inapplicable, however, Justice Minton
was reluctant to upset state legislation on the ground that it interfered
with interstate commerce. For example, he wrote for a 5-4 majority in
Buck v. Californ 218 sustaining a San Diego County requirement for a
permit for taxicabs operating between points in California and Mexico
through, but not stopping in, the county. His position is consistent with
his dissent in the Arkansas case since the Motor Carrier Act of 1935
expressly exempted taxicabs from its application." 7 Justice Minton con-
cluded that in the absence of applicable or conflicting federal legislation,
the states and municipalities were free to impose reasonable regulations
on interstate commerce the impact of which is essentially local. In his
words:
211. Southern Pac. Co. v. Giles, 351 U.S. 493 (1956).
212. Reed v. Pennsylvania R.R., 351 U.S. 502 (1956).
213. Id. at 510 (dissenting opinion).
214. Ibid.
215. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Wood, 344 U.S. 157 (1952) ; cf. Castle v. Hayes
Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954).
216. 343 U.S. 99 (1952).
217. 49 Stat. 545 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1952).
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As the ordinance is not in conflict with and may be con-
strued consistently with the federal regulations and in keeping
with the latter's purpose, they may stand together.
The operation of taxicabs is a local business. For that
reason, Congress has left the field largely to the states. Opera-
tion of taxicabs across state lines or international boundaries is
so closely related to the local situation that the regulation of all
taxicabs operating in the community only indirectly affects
those in commerce, and so long as there is no attempt to dis-
criminatorily regulate or directly burden or charge for the
privilege of doing business in interstate or foreign commerce,
the regulation is valid. The operation is 'essentially local,' and
in the absence of federal regulation, state regulation is required
in the public interest .... "'
Similarly, in a unanimous decision sustaining California's power to
assess a portion of the cost of grade separation improvements to the rail-
road without regard to the benefits it would receive, Justice Minton rea-
soned that the "construction and use of public streets is a matter pe-
culiarly of local concern and great leeway is allowed local authorities
where there is no competing federal regulation, even though interstate
commerce be subject to material interference." '219
B. REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS
Justice Minton's votes with respect to federal and state regulation
of the distribution of natural gas followed a similar pattern. Thus, he
joined one opinion which broadly interpreted the applicability of the fed-
eral Natural Gas Act by holding that it applies to intrastate distribu-
tion.22 Subsequently, he wrote the Court's opinion in Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Wiscoi-in22' holding that the Federal Power Commission had
jurisdiction over sales to an interstate pipeline company by an independ-
ent natural gas producer, although the FPC had determined that it lacked
such jurisdiction. The applicable provision of the Natural Gas Act ex-
empted from FPC jurisdiction "the production or gatherihg of natural
gas." '222 Phillips' activities in the production and transmission of natural
gas ended with the sales to the pipeline companies, and did not extend to
218. Buck v. California, 343 U.S. 99, 102 (1952).
219. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Public Util. Conm'n, 346 U.S. 355 (1953).
220. Federal Power Conn'n v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950).
221. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
222. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1952).
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its interstate transportation or local distribution. Although Phillips'
function was thus restricted primarily to producing and gathering gas,
the Court held that its sales to the pipeline companies were separate and
apart from its production and gathering activities and, therefore, not
within the applicable exemption. Justice Minton's conclusion was but-
tressed by the legislative and judicial history which indicated that the Act
was intended to fill a gap in regulation left by decisions of the Court
which had denied to the states the power to regulate.22 ' He refused to
weaken the "protection of consumers against exploitation at the hands of
natural-gas companies [which] was the primary aim of the Natural Gas
Act . . by a strained interpretation of the existing statutory lan-
guage.'
224
Consistent with the broad scope he attributed to the Natural Gas
Act, he joined in two decisions denying the states' power to regulate on
the ground that Congress had occupied the field and conferred exclusive
jurisdiction on the FPC, in one instance with respect to interstate sales
to municipalities 22 and in the other to sales for resale in interstate
commerce. -
2 6
As with respect to carriers, where federal regulation was not in-
volved, he consistently voted to sustain state regulation. Thus, prior to
the Phillips Petroleum case, he had joined the Court in sustaining state
regulation of the well head price of gas sold in interstate commerce where
the FPC's jurisdiction was not raised and was expressly not deter-
mined.2 7  And he himself wrote the Court's opinion in Panhandle East-
ern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Comm'i 28 holding that
Michigan could constitutionally require a certificate of convenience and
necessity for interstate sales of gas directly to the consumer which were
not covered by the Natural Gas Act which applied only to "sales for
resale. " "22 Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, urged that even in the ab-
sence of applicable federal legislation, such a state requirement is for-
bidden by the commerce clause itself. Justice Minton's reasoning was
similar in many respects to his opinion a year later in sustaining San
Diego County's permit requirement for taxicabs.2 3  He wrote in part:
223. E.g., Public Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
224. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 685 (1954).
225. United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295 (1953).
226. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Panoma Corp., 349 U.S. 44 (1955).
227. Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950) ; see also
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 (1950).
228. 341 U.S. 329 (1951).
229. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1952).
230. Buck v. California, 343 U.S. 99 (1952).
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It does not follow that because appellant is engaged in in-
terstate commerce it is free from state regulation or free to
manage essentially local aspects of its business as it pleases.
The course of this Court's decisions recognize no such li-
cense. . . . Such a course would not accomplish the effective
dual regulation Congress intended, and would permit appellant
to prejudice substantial local interests. This is not compelled
by the Natural Gas Act or the Commerce Clause of the Con-
stitution. 3'
C. REGULATION OF LABOR RELATIONS
Justice Minton's approach to federal and state regulation of labor
relations was substantially the same as with respect to dual regulation of
carriers and distribution of natural gas. The expansive applicability of
federal regulation of labor relations embodied in the National Labor
Relations Act232 and the Railway Labor Act. is illustrated by a decision
in which Justice Minton joined holding that the former Act applies to
local car dealers. 4
Consistent with his view of the scope of this federal regulation, he
joined in striking down a Michigan statute regulating strikes which con-
flicted with the NLRA23" and a Nebraska prohibition of the union shop,
authorized by the federal Railway Labor Act.236 Similarly, Justice Min-
ton wrote the Court's opinion holding that a state court has no jurisdic-
tion over a suit by a railroad against a trucking union because federal
law conferred jurisdiction of the dispute on the NLRB.3 7
But where the state regulation did not clearly conflict with federal
regulation, Justice Minton consistently voted to sustain it. Thus, he
joined in dissenting from a decision holding that the Wisconsin Public
Utility Anti-Strike Law"-3 ' was unconstitutional because it conflicted
with the NLRA, a decision which left Milwaukee's gas consumers help-
less. 239 The dissenters urged that although Congress had not prohibited
such strikes, the federal statute did not clearly indicate that the states
could not do so. Justice Minton later joined two decisions holding that
231. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U.S.
329, 337 (1951).
232. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1952).
233. 44 Stat 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. -(1952).
234. Howell Chevrolet Co. v. NLRB, 346 U.S. 482 (1953).
235. International Union UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
236. Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
237. Local 25 v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 350 U.S. 155 (1956).
238. Wis. STAT. §§ 111.50-.64 (1957).
239. Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383(1951).
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a state may permit a civil tort action for acts constituting a federal un-
fair labor practice"' and may enjoin violent union action even though the
action also constituted an unfair labor practice.24' Justices Douglas and
Black, joined by Justice Warren in the latter case, dissented on the
ground that the federal statute is exclusive and prohibits such supple-
mentary state action. In a subsequent case following Justice Minton's
retirement the states suffered a setback in a decision holding that the
states have no power to regulate labor disputes over which the NLRB has
jurisdiction, even though the NLRB refuses to exercise its jurisdic-
tion.242 This decision can be supported on the basis of the statutory
language although it certainly results in the kind of undesirable no-man's
land free from any regulation which Justice Minton, among others, was
reluctant to create.
State injunctions against picketing presented special problems. As
with other forms of state regulation, Justice Minton and the Court con-
sistently struck down injunctions of picketing involving disputes regu-
lated by federal law. 43 But because picketing is in part a means of com-
munication to some extent within the protection for freedom of speech,
under some circumstances a state may not enjoin picketing even though
it has no relation to labor relations in interstate commerce regulated by
federal statutes.244 Several important cases were decided before Justice
Minton's elevation to the Court. In Thornhill v. Alabama24 the Court
held unconstitutional an Alabama statute which was broad enough to
authorize prevention of all picketing, in American Federation of Labor v.
Swing248 it struck down an Illinois injunction based on the absence of an
employer-employee relationship, but in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co.247 it sustained an injunction against picketing designed to induce an
employer to violate Missouri's antitrust laws. Justice Black's opinion in
the latter case concluded that the picketing was part of a course of con-
duct which created a clear and present danger of violation of state law
which the state had power to prevent.
240. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) ; see
also International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958) ; International
Union UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
241. UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
242. Guss v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
243. UMW v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956); Weber v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955) ; Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485
(1953) ; see also Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) ; Hotel Employees
Union v. Sax Enterprises, Inc., 79 Sup. Ct. 273 (1959).
244. See Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
245. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
246. 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
247. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
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In a series of subsequent decisions the Court, relying on Giboney,
sustained state injunctions of picketing conducted for a purpose unlawful
under state law. For example, Justice Minton joined in one decision up-
holding an injunction against picketing for the purpose of inducing a
violation of Virginia's "right-to-work" law.24' He wrote the Court's
opinion in Building Service Employees Int'l Union v. Gagzam2 9 in which
the Court sustained an injunction against peaceful picketing by a union
designed to induce an employer to coerce his employees to join the union,
contrary to a statutory declaration of state policy. Thus, the purpose of
the picketing was to use "its economic power with that of its allies to
compel respondent to abide by union policy rather than by the declared
policy of the State."2  "There is no contention that picketing directed
at employees for organization purposes would be violative of that policy.
The decree does not have that effect . . . [but] was tailored to prevent
a specific violation of an important state law."25' "To judge the wisdom
of such policy is not for us; ours is but to determine whether a restraint
of picketing in reliance on the policy is an unwarranted encroachment
upon rights protected from state abridgment by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 2  Justice Minton held that the Giboney decision applied even
though the statutory policy contained no criminal sanctions, and he dis-
tinguished the Swing decision on the ground that there the state had "re-
lied on the absence of an employer-employee relationship"2 " while the
"basis for the instant decree is the unlawful objective of the picketing,
namely, coercion by the employer of the employees' selection of a bar-
gaining representative."2 4  In a similar decision since his retirement the
Court upheld an injunction against picketing, like that in the Gazzc
case, for the purpose of coercing an employer to interfere with the right
conferred by Wisconsin statute on his employees to freedom of choice in
the selection of their bargaining representative.2"
A significant extension of the Giboney rule is embodied in Interna-
tional Brotherhood v. Hanke.. in which the Court sustained an injunc-
tion against picketing designed to force a self-employer to observe certain
hours, although his observance of such hours would not have been un-
248. Local 10 v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953) ; see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-69 to -74
(1950).
249. 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
250. Id. at 540.
251. Id. at 539-40, 541.
252. Id. at 539.
253. Ibid.
254. Ibid.
255. International Brotherhood v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
256. 339 U.S. 870 (1950).
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lawful. In Hughes v. Superior Court57 decided the same day, Justice
Frankfurter wrote the Court's opinion sustaining an injunction against
picketing for the purpose of forcing a grocer to hire Negro clerks in pro-
portion to its Negro customers since such a hiring policy would ap-
parently have been unlawful under California judicial decisions. To
Justice Frankfurter the Hanke case was the same since the state courts
could "choose to prohibit the right to secure submission through picket-
ing ' while at the same time permitting "voluntary acquiescence in the
demands of the union."25 Justice Minton dissented in the Hanke case on
the narrow ground that the injunction in question was so broad that it
applied to permissible picketing, and hence should be upset just as the
broad statute in Thornhill was struck down because on its face it applied
to permissible as well as prohibited picketing. Primarily, however, he
was concerned with Justice Frankfurter's conclusion that because "picket-
ing is 'indeed a hybrid,' "20 "peaceful picketing and truthful publicity"20'
is not "protected by the constitutional guaranty of the right of free
speech" '262 as "publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars,
[which] may convey the same information or make the same charge as
do those patrolling a picket line."2 3 To Justice Minton it was "too late
now to deny that those cases were rooted in the free speech doctrine. I
think we should not decide the instant cases in a manner so alien to the
basis of prior decisions." '264
Justice Minton's protest that the Hanke case represented a shift in
the basis of the Court's approach to the problem of picketing seems justi-
fied. The Court in the Giboney case could equate picketing with other
forms of speech and still permit it to be enjoined where it created a clear
and present danger of violation of state law. But it is one thing to per-
mit a state to enjoin picketing for an unlawful purpose and quite another
to prohibit picketing as an unlawful means to a lawful objective. Such
a conclusion must rest on the assumption that picketing is more than
speech, a "hybrid," which may be enjoined when the element of speech
257. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
258. International Brotherhood v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 479 (1950).
259. Ibid.
260. Id. at 474.
261. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 482 (1937).
262. International Brotherhood v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 484 (1950) (dissenting
opinion).
263. Hughes v. Superior Ct., 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950).
264. International Brotherhood v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 483 (1950) (dissenting
opinion).
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is subordinated to its other aspects. The justification for such an as-
sumption was left unclear in Justice Frankfurter's opinion, and it was not
until later than he advised us that the Hanke decision has another "im-
plied reassessment"2 6 following the Court's "decisive reconsideration" '266
in Giboney. Assuming picketing may be more than speech, determina-
tion of the power of a state to enjoin picketing for a lawful purpose would
seem to require careful analysis of the nature and elements of the par-
ticular picketing enjoined. Otherwise, even picketing which is solely or
primarily for the purpose of publicity and communication could be en-
joined under the reasoning of Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the
Hanke case.
D. REGULATION OF BUSINESS
The generally broad applicability of the federal antitrust laws is
illustrated by two decisions in which Justice Minton joined holding them
applicable to real estate brokers26 and to an interstate seller of bread
whose acts in question were aimed at a local competitor in one area and
solely intrastate in character.26 The Court's per curiam decision in
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.269 that organized baseball is not sub-
ject to the Sherman Act.. was placed solely on the basis of an earlier
decision to the same effect.. and was not followed in later decisions dif-
ficult to distinguish factually. Thus, the Court subsequently held that
the legitimate theatre, 2 boxing,273 football,7 4 and local building construc-
tion... were all subject to the Sherman Act.
Justice Minton concurred in the theatre case which followed an
earlier decision to the same effect,7 6 but he dissented in both the boxing
and building cases. With respect to the builders, he argued that the
Government's allegations did not establish a conspiracy to restrain the
interstate trade in building materials but only to restrain local activity.
"Interstate commerce has ended. There is no intent or purpose to re-
strain interstate commerce. The effect upon commerce is incidental, re-
265. International Brotherhood v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 291 (1957).
266. Ibid.
267. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., U.S. 485 (1950);
but cf. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
268. Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
269. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
270. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952).
271. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
272. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 223 (1955).
273. United States v. International Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., 348.U.S. 236 (1955).
274. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
275. United States v. Employing Lathers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 198 (1954) ; United States
v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954).
276. Hart v. B. F. Kieth Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271 (1923).
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mote and indirect. It is a restraint that spends itself on a purely local in-
cident." '277 In Justice Minton's view not even the alleged exclusion of
out-of-state contractors rendered the builders' conspiracy subject to the
Sherman Act. To him Toolson was not merely an aberration justified
by stare decisis. "Contracting to plaster a building in Chicago by an
outstate contractor is not commerce, even if the contractor did intend to
bring his men from outstate, any more than bringing men from one state
into another to play baseball is commerce. . . . The materials to plaster
the building flow without interruption to the building site. There a local
labor situation arises that has nothing to do with commerce or any con-
spiracy to restrain it." '278
His view with respect to the alleged conspiracy of professional box-
ing was substantially the same. To him it was "an example of the tail
wagging the dog" '79 to hold that "the boxing bout becomes interstate
commerce" "when boxers travel from State to State, carrying their shorts
and fancy dressing robes in a ditty bag in order to participate in a boxing
bout, which is wholly intrastate... "280 Not only did he believe that
boxing is local, but also that it is "not trade or commerce"2 at all be-
cause personal services unrelated to production are not commerce.
His narrow view of the scope of the Sherman Act's prohibition of
conspiracies in restraint of interstate commerce is not necessarily incon-
sistent with the broader scope he accorded to the FELA, for example,282
since the language of that Act, broader than the Sherman Act, applied to
employees whose duties furthered or closely and directly affected inter-
state commerce. Nevertheless, his analysis of the scope of "[interstate]
commerce" itself, as used in the Sherman Act, seems unduly restrictive.
These cases illustrate several aspects of Justice Minton's approach
to the problems before the Court. First, in interpreting the scope of fed-
eral regulation, he stressed the literal language of the particular statu-
tory provision and minimized external considerations bearing on the in-
tent of Congress.288 Second, he was very reluctant to upset state regula-
tion of local incidents of interstate commerce in the absence of a clear
conflict with federal regulation or a clear preemption by Congress of a
277. United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 195 (1954) (dis-
senting opinion).
278. Id. at 196-97 (dissenting opinion).
279. United States v. International Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 251
(1955) (dissenting opinion).
280. Ibid.
281. Id. at 253.
282. See Reed v. Pennsylvania R.R., 351 U.S. 502 (1956); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Giles, 351 U.S. 493 (1956).
283. See, e.g., Reider v. Thompson, 339 U.S. 113 (1950); cases cited note 282
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particular field of regulation.28 4 Finally, he equated picketing with
other forms of communication with respect to the constitutional protec-
tion of freedom of speech,"' but as with other forms of speech, he ac-
corded to the states considerable power to restrain picketing in the in-
terest of preserving and enforcing other public policies deemed by them
important.286
IV. FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON
POWERS OF STATE TAXATION
To meet the ever-increasing pressure for additional revenue, the
states have frequently exercised their powers of taxation to, and some-
times beyond, the limits imposed on them by the Constitution. State
taxes on private enterprises, often far distant, must comply with both the
minimum standards of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment and the limitations imposed by the commerce clause. Because "the
power to tax involves the power to destroy"2 7 a comparable limitation is
imposed on the power of the states to tax the federal government which,
within the scope of the authority conferred upon it by the Constitution, is
supreme."' The Court's decisions with respect to such taxes illustrate,
if nothing else, the importance of the form of the tax selected by the
state. Justices continue to disagree whether this stress on form repre-
sents over-emphasis on labels or recognition of decisive constitutional
distinctions.
A. STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
In determining the validity of state taxes related to interstate com-
merce, the Court has sought to prevent interstate commerce from being
subjected to burdensome taxes which adversely affect its competitive po-
sition with local commerce, and at the same time to assure that the states
are left with sufficient power to require "interstate commerce [to] pay
its way."28  Traditionally, the Court has held that "[i]nterstate com-
merce cannot be taxed at all, even though the same amount of tax is laid
on domestic commerce, or that which is carried on solely within the
284. See, e.g., Buck v. California, 343 U.S. 99 (1952); Panhandle Eastern Pipe
Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329 (1951); see also Breard v. City
of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349,
357-60 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
285. See International Brotherhood v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 481-84 (1950) (dis-
senting opinion).
286. See, e.g., Building Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532
(1950).
287. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
288. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
289. Postal-Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259 (1919).
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state."2 0 But where the tax was imposed on an appropriate local subject,
such as the privilege of using the state's highways or of conducting a
local retail business, Justice Minton joined the Court in sustaining it.
For example, he joined the Court in upholding: an Illinois tax measured
by gross receipts on the privilege of making retail sales, as applied to a
foreign corporation which had qualified to do business in Illinois and
operated a local retail outlet there;21 a Chicago flat fee per truck on the
privilege of operating on the city streets, as applied to trucks used in both
intra-city and interstate transportation; and an Illinois tax on the privi-
lege of using its highways,292 measured by the weight of the vehicles, as
applied to a taxpayer who used his trucks for both interstate and intra-
state business." 3
Adhering to the traditional view, however, Justice Minton joined a
majority of the Court in holding unconstitutional a Connecticut tax on
the privilege of doing business where the business conducted by the tax-
payer was solely interstate.294 He also joined in two subsequent decisions
striking down similar Mississippi299 and Virginia.. taxes, even though in
the latter instance the state court had denominated the tax as one on
property rather than on the privilege of doing business. The Court rea-
soned that since a state has no power to withhold the privilege of doing
interstate business, these taxes lacked a constitutionally permissible sub-
ject matter. The view of the minority in these cases that this was simply
a matter of labels having no constitutional significance seems erroneous.
No one would seriously contend that an Indiana property tax on the
Wisconsin real estate of an Indiana resident is constitutional merely be-
cause Indiana might have imposed a tax of like amount on the same
taxpayer by adoption of an income tax, for example. While the dis-
tinctions involved in the privilege tax cases are more subtle, in either
instance the Court must judge the validity of the tax on the basis of what
it is, not what it's called or what it might have been.
While sales taxes have become increasingly popular as revenue pro-
ducers, they have been held unconstitutional as applied to interstate sales
as taxes directly on interstate commerce.29 ' However, the states have
290. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 497 (1897); but cf.
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 79 Sup. Ct. 357 (1959).
291. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
292. Chicago v. Willett Co., 344 U.S. 574 (1953).
293. Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583 (1953).
294. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
295. Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952).
296. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954); cf. Railway
Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 79 Sup. Ct. 411 (1959).
297. McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); cf. Michigan-Wisconsin
Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
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been able to accomplish substantially the same result by enactment of a
use tax to be collected by the seller but theoretically justified on the
ground that it is not imposed until after the interstate transaction is com-
pleted.2" The Court has recognized, but refused to give effect to, the
fact that a use tax so inextricably interwoven with interstate sales is just
as great a barrier to interstate trade as a sales tax. However, Justice
Minton joined a 5-4 majority in the Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland211
striking down the Maryland use tax as a denial of due process, as applied
to a Delaware retailer whose contacts with Maryland were minimal but
did at least include regular deliveries to Maryland customers.
State property taxes on moving instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce have also caused difficult constitutional problems. The Court has
held that a state other than the corporate domicile and home port may
impose a property tax on railroad cars3 . and barges.0' fairly apportioned
to the amount of commerce done in the state. Justice Minton joined the
Court in extending this rule to airplanes, sustaining an apportioned
Nebraska property tax on airplanes which on interstate flights regularly
landed in Nebraska which was neither the corporate domicile nor the
home port.
0 2
This rule permitting a number of states to impose apportioned taxes
would seem to represent an accommodation of the competing interests of
various states under the commerce clause where each may have sufficient
contact with the property taxed to satisfy the requirements of due process
even with respect to an unapportioned tax. Where it is not apparent,
however, that more than one state has power to tax the same property,
there is no danger of multiple taxation and hence no need under the
commerce clause to restrict the taxing state to an apportioned tax. Hence,
the Court sustained unapportioned taxes by the corporate domicile on
railroad cars30 3 and airplanes0 4 where it was "not shown here that a de-
fined part of the domiciliary corpus has acquired a permanent location,
i.e., a taxing situs, elsewhere." '  In these two cases the property taxed
was located in the taxing states for a substantial portion of time. Hence,
the only problem was whether the commerce clause limited the power of
these states to the imposition of an apportioned tax. Where, however, a
298. General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944) ; Henneford
v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
299. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
300. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
301. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
302. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
303. People ex rel. New York C. & H.R.R.R. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584 (1906).
304. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
305. Id. at 295 (even though apportioned property taxes were being paid to other
states).
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state imposes an unapportioned tax on property wholly outside the state,
its power under the due process clause is brought into question. It is a
different problem from that in the Miller Brothers case striking down the
Maryland use tax, for here the taxing state clearly has jurisdiction over
the taxpayer, but it has no contact with the property sought to be taxed.
In Standard Oil Co. v. Peck..6 the Court struck down as a violation
of due process an unapportioned Ohio tax on inland boats and barges
which, for practical purposes, were never in Ohio, the domiciliary state,
although they were not shown to have acquired a taxable situs elsewhere.
Justice Minton dissented on the ground that: "Where no other taxing
situs was shown to exist, the state of the domicile was permitted to tax,
irrespective of the amount of time the vessels were present in that
state."' 7  From a due process standpoint, a state's power to tax ordi-
narily should depend on the degree of its contact with the property taxed,
rather than on the presence or absence of permanent contact with any
other state, the significance of which should relate primarily to the bur-
den of the tax on interstate commerce. Justice Minton's position is
clearly the rule with respect to seagoing vessels,3"' but they are unique in
that they spend most of their time at sea, outside any state. A com-
parable decision in Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky... with
respect to railroad cars is not completely clear since the Court seemed
to assume that cars which were never in the domiciliary state would
necessarily acquire a taxable situs elsewhere. Like railroad cars, inland
vessels will necessarily be in another state or country whenever they are
out of the domiciliary state. In this respect both differ from coastal ves-
sels which are not in any state much of the time, despite the fact, relied
upon by Justice Minton, that there may be difficult factual problems of
proof with respect to an inland vessel which operates on rivers which
form state boundary lines. Accordingly, the Court appears to have been
correct in concluding that absence from the taxing state, not presence in
another state, was the decisive factor in the Union Refrigerator case, and
in applying the same principle to inland vessels to test the power of the
domiciliary state under the due process clause to impose an unappor-
tioned tax.
B. STATE TAXATION OF FEDERAL INSTRUMENTALITIES
In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall wrote the Court's
opinion striking down a state tax on a national bank because "the power
306. 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
307. Id. at 388 (dissenting opinion).
308. Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911).
309. 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
MINTON, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
to tax is the power to destroy"31 an authorized federal instrumentality.
But as the activities of the federal government have continued to expand,
the pressure on the states to find permissible methods of taxing at least
those with whom the Government does business has correspondingly in-
creased. The questions which have presented the Court with the most
difficulty are those with respect to which Congress has neither expressly
authorized nor forbidden the states to tax. The course of the Court's
decisions has been accurately described by Justice Jackson:
Looking backward it is easy to see that the line between the
taxable and the immune has been drawn by an unsteady hand.
But since 1819, when Chief Justice Marshall in the McCul-
loch case expounded the principle that properties, functions, and
instrumentalities of the Federated Government are immune
from taxation by its constituent parts, this Court never has de-
parted from that basic doctrine or wavered in its application.
In the course of time it held that even without explicit congres-
sional action immunities had become communicated to the in-
come or property or transactions of others because they in some
manner dealt with or acted for the Government. In recent
years this Court has curtailed sharply the doctrine of implied
delegated immunity. But unshaken, rarely questioned, and in-
deed not questioned in this case, is the principle that possessions,
institutions, and activities of the Federal Government itself in
the absence of express congressional consent are not subject
to any form of state taxation.31" '
In that case the Court struck down a Pennsylvania property tax on
Government property leased to a private contractor although collection
of the tax was sought only from the latter. On the other hand, where
the subject matter of the tax belonged to the private contractor, the
Court sustained similar taxes even though they might impose a like eco-
nomic burden on the Government. Thus, Justice Minton joined the
Court in sustaining a Tennessee tax on the privilege of storing gasoline,
as applied to a private corporation storing gasoline owned by the United
States." 2
Similar distinctions were made with respect to taxes on transactions
in which the Government was involved. Earlier cases had sustained state
sales taxes on sales to Government contractors, even though the ultimate
310. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
311. United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 176-77 (1944).
312. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495 (1953).
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economic burden of the tax fell on the Government. 13 But Justice Min-
ton joined the Court in striking down a similar Arkansas tax where the
contractor made the purchase as agent for the Government, even though
collection was sought only from the private contractors, since the legal
incidence of the tax was on a sale to the United States. 14
The Court recently demolished these distinctions with respect to
property taxes in sustaining a Michigan property tax as applied to prop-
erty owned by the United States but in the possession of a private con-
tractor."3 Although the Court conceded that the tax in question was not
a privilege tax, it concluded that "to strike down a tax on the possessor
because of such verbal omission would only prove a victory for empty
formalisms. And empty formalisms are too shadowy a basis for invali-
dating state tax laws." '316 To some this will appear to be a victory of
substance over form, while to others it will represent a departure from
140 years of venerable and unbroken judicial authority. While this de-
cision will neither bankrupt the federal government, nor offend the
"states' righters" who are the current Court's most vocal critics, it is an
interesting illustration of a departure by the present Court from prior
judicial authority.
Sometimes Congress has made the Court's job easier by expressly
exempting particular private persons or activities from state taxes. For
example, Justice Minton joined the Court in striking down a Colorado
tax on a soldier's property exempted from such tax by federal statute
17
and a Tennessee sales tax on sales to contractors with the Atomic Energy
Commission similarly exempted by federal statute. 8'
At other times Congress has lent the states a helping hand by ex-
pressly authorizing the states to tax activities otherwise exempt. For
example, the Buck Act permits states to impose taxes on or "measured
by" net income derived from activities in a federal area. 19 Relying on
this statute, Justice Minton wrote the Court's opinion sustaining a Louis-
ville tax measured by net income for the privilege of working in the
city, as applied to employees of a federal ordnance depot.' The dissent
of Justices Black and Douglas reasoned that the Louisville tax was not
an income tax because for state purposes it was a privilege tax and not an
313. E.g., Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941); James v. Dravo Con-
tracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
314. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
315. City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of America, 355 U.S. 489 (1958).
316. Id. at 493.
317. Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322 (1953).
318. Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952).
319. 61 Stat. 641 (1947), 4 U.S.C. §§ 106, 110 (1952).
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income tax. But Justice Minton correctly concluded that "the right to
tax earnings within the area was not given Kentucky in accordance with
the Kentucky law as to what is an income tax. The grant was given
within the definition of the Buck Act, and this was for any tax measured
by net income, gross income, or gross receipts." '' More interesting than
this question of statutory interpretation was the expression of Justice
Minton's philosophy in resolving this problem of dual sovereignty:
The fiction of a state within a state can have no validity to
prevent the state from exercising its power over the federal area
within its boundaries, so long as there is no interference with
the jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government. The
sovereign rights in this dual relationship are not antagonistic.
Accommodation and cooperation are their aim. It is friction,
not fiction, to which we must give heed.322
Whether or not the traditional views with respect to the power of
the states to tax interstate commerce and federal instrumentalities over-
stress form, it is clear that Justice Minton adhered to them. This is mani-
fested in his dissenting opinion from the case denying the domiciliary
state power to tax barges outside the state, 23 as well as by his votes in
decisions striking down state attempts to tax the privilege of engaging in
interstate commerce2 and sales to the federal government. 25 As far as
Justice Minton is concerned, more than anything else, these cases illus-
trate the heavy reliance he placed on relatively old courses of decision of
the Court, and his reluctance, manifested in other cases, 26 to extend re-
cent intervening deviations from them.
(To be concluded.)
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